

EU crisis management: an assessment of member states' contributions and positions

Kirsten Soder

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Introduction

Under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework¹ the European Union (EU) has conducted 22 crisis management operations; of these it deployed troops six times since becoming operational in 2003.² A unanimous decision is necessary for an EU crisis management operation to be launched, although not all member states actively participate in these operations – i.e. send personnel and contribute towards operational costs. For example, during the planning process for EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 2008, the EU faced significant obstacles in getting the necessary troop commitments from member states. The mission only became operational due to France's decision to contribute more troops, which provided further grounds for those that labelled the operation in reality a French force under EU command.³

This paper examines the crisis management efforts under the CSDP and analyses the willingness of EU member states to contribute troops to CSDP operations. It assesses the member states' contributions in order to survey trends and alterations in member states' engagement and looks at the underlying national political factors. The study will focus on the military CSDP operations Concordia (2003), Operation Artemis (2003), EUFOR Althea (2004–), EUFOR DR Congo (2006), EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008–2009) and EU NAVFOR Somalia (2008–).

Data on EU member state's contributions

Information on EU member states' contributions are drawn from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) Database on Multilateral Peace Operations and its archive.⁴ Additional information on an operation is taken from a wide selection of publicly available governmental and secondary sources. Until now, the EU does not provide an update on contributions to CSDP operations on a regular base (as done by the United Nations) and little is known about the function of all personnel deployed (e.g. combat troops, medical units and headquarters staff). Troop numbers constantly rotated, thus

¹ When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 Dec. 2009, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was renamed Common Security and Defence Policy.

² See Council of the European Union, 'Common Security and Defence Policy', <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en>>. The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM, 1991-2007), deployed to the Western Balkans and the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine) were/are conducted by EU Commission.

³ Geoffrey Van Orden quoted in Grunstein, J., 'EUFOR Chad: A Step Forward for European Defense', *World Politics Review*; 28 Mar. 2008, <<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/Article.aspx?id=1847>>.

⁴ Information is obtained either from the Council of the European Union or the conducting operations themselves. Contributions and number of personnel provided are estimates of international personnel located in theatre, if not otherwise stated. For more information see SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database at <<http://conflict.sipri.org/>>.

provided information seldom reflect the actual numbers on the ground. In the case of Operation Artemis and EUFOR DR Congo only one data point is available. Due to the short deployment periods of three and four months, respectively, the numbers will be considered as representative. For all these reasons, numbers presented in this paper are estimates. No national breakdown is available for EU NAVFOR Somalia. In the case of a comparative analysis of member states' contributions, the data available is converted into troop-days to reflect the differential durations of deployments.

EU crisis management – military operations a common endeavour?

The idea of a common foreign and security policy was formalized in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) by introducing the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar. Among others, the aim was to conduct activities such as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking (Petersberg tasks).⁵ However, in the 1990s during the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, the EU was unable to act autonomously; it had to rely on US capacities (e.g. transportation, intelligence). Revealing that US interests and interests of EU member states are not a priori identical, the Balkan crisis also showed that neither the EU itself nor EU member states could respond to the new global security challenges by itself. Following the EU's failure during the 1990s, the two biggest military powers in the EU, France and the UK met in St. Malo (1998) to confirm their commitment to a common foreign and security policy: "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises".⁶ The Franco-British Joint Declaration "breathed life into the pale figure of defence at the level of the EU".⁷ After several further steps taken towards the operationalisation of CSDP, in 2003 the first operation under the CSDP framework was launched.

I. Willingness of EU member states to contribute troops to CSDP missions

Before looking at EU member states' contributions to CSDP operations, it is important to bear in mind that just a small ratio of EU member states' military personnel has yet been deployed to EU crisis management operations. Over the last years, the total of EU member states' contributions to CSDP missions has been by far surpassed by contributions to operations conducted by the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For example, at the end of 2009, approximately 51 700 troops of EU member states

⁵ Petersberg Declaration, Part II.4., 1992, p.6

⁶ Joint Declaration on European Defence, Franco-British Summit, St. Malo, 4 Dec. 1998, Art. 2.

⁷ Mawdsley, J. and Quille, G., 'The EU Security Strategy: A new framework for ESDP and equipping the EU Rapid Reaction Force', *ISIS Report*, 2003, <http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/reports_4.pdf>, p. 9.

were globally deployed to multilateral peace operations, of those 7 per cent were deployed to CSDP mission, 15 per cent to UN missions and 78 per cent to NATO missions.⁸

The EU has launched six military operations since 2003. Two missions were deployed to the territories of the former Yugoslavia: operation Concordia to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and EUFOR Althea to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Four times the EU carried out operations in Africa: Operation Artemis and EUFOR DR Congo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), EUFOR Tchad/RCA in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic (CAR) and lastly EU NAVFOR Somalia, which is deployed in the south of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and part of the Indian Ocean.

Due to the variously mandated time periods of the missions, ranging from three months to over five years, troop deployments to CSDP operations fluctuated highly over the last six years. Since the launch of EUFOR Althea in December 2004 military personnel have been constantly deployed under the CSDP framework, peaking in summer and fall 2006 with over 7500 EU member troops assigned to EUFOR Althea and EUFOR DR Congo. EUFOR Althea with a peak strength of close to 7000 troops (2004) has been the largest CSDP operation conducted to date.

Decisions on issues concerning common EU security and defence aspects have to be adopted unanimously. Thus, every member state has to approve the establishment of an EU crisis management operation. However, the declaration of consent to launch an operation under the CSDP framework does not necessarily match the willingness of EU member states to provide personnel, i.e. troops. EU member states' contributions to the conducted CSDP missions varied in frequency and force level.

The first two CSDP operations—Concordia and Operation Artemis—both conducted in 2003 were carried out by a 15-member states union. Thirteen and 11 member states, respectively, contributed personnel to those operations. Along the EU enlargements in 2004 and later in 2007, the number of member states increased to 27. CSDP operations launched after 2003 could count on the contributions of 24 (EUFOR Althea, including Bulgaria and Romania prior to their 2007-membership), 16 (EUFOR DR Congo), 18 (EUFOR Tchad/RCA)⁹ and 10 (EU NAVFOR Somalia) member states (see figure 1).

⁸ The statistic only considers contributions made to operations carried out by the EU, NATO and UN. Troop contributions to other operations such as operation Licorne in Côte d'Ivoire and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai are not included.

⁹ EUFOR Tchad/RCA was supported by troops from 13 EU member states. Furthermore, five member states contributed to the force headquarters in Chad while four member states sent personnel to the operational headquarters in France.




Figure 1 Percentage of EU member states contributing

Apart from Denmark¹⁰ and Malta¹¹, every member state contributed at least twice to CSDP military operations. Of all 27 member states 70 per cent contributed to half of the missions and 26 per cent contributed to all. A group that contributed every time, partly with minor contributions, composes of Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden.¹²

Looking at the overall contributions in detail the high share of member states contributing small contingents is salient. In particular, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and Luxembourg have just deployed a handful of personnel to CSDP missions. National deployments ranged from 1 to over 1600 (France/Artemis) personnel.

The top ten contributors to military CSDP operations over the last six years in absolute numbers were—in descendent order—France, Italy, Germany, Spain, the UK, Poland, the Netherlands, Austria, Hungary and Portugal (see figure 2).

¹⁰ By signing the Edinburgh Agreement (1992), Denmark obtained four opt-outs from legislations and treaties of the EU. One opt-out affects the common EU defence policy. Denmark does not participate in any decision-making process concerning military CSDP operations and it does not contribute troops to military EU operations. Denmark is included in the statistics.

¹¹ Malta reported that it does not have any deployable land forces in 2008. EDA, Defence Data of EDA participating Member States in 2008, 23 Dec. 2009.

¹² Austria contributed five times, however it does not have the capacity to actively contribute to EU NAVFOR Somalia; Austria does not have naval forces. Austrian Parliament, 'Anfragebeantwortung' [Reply on request], 292/AB XXIV. GP, 22 Jan. 2009, <http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIV/AB/AB_00292/fnameorig_148065.html>.




Figure 2 Top ten contributors (total)

Due to the long-term deployment of EUFOR Althea, which is five times longer on the ground than any other CSDP mission, the deployment pattern is greatly influence by Althea’s troop contributions. Apart from being the mission with the most member states contributing (24), compared to Concordia, Operation Artemis, EUFOR DRC and EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EUFOR Althea is also the mission with the most evenly distributed deployment pattern. No EU member has a share higher than 15 per cent. The other four missions mentioned above are in contrast marked by French contributions that were responsible for 43 to 83 per cent of the deployed military. For each of the later missions French was the framework nation, i.e. the member state with the appropriate means that was in charge of the operation.¹³




Figure 3 Top ten contributions EUFOR Althea




Figure 4 Top contributions Concordia, Artemis, EUFOR DRC and EUFOR Tchad/RCA

¹³ The EU Framework Nation Concept was adopted on 24 July 2002.

II. Trends and alteration in member states' engagement

Although each mission has its unique character, the most obvious trends regarding the six investigated CSDP missions is the regional trend regarding the number of countries contributing. A high number of EU member states contributed to missions in Europe. Concordia was supported by 13 EU member states and in addition by 10 candidate states; EUFOR Althea was supported by 24 member states, including the 2007 joining member states Bulgaria and Romania.

First, attention should be paid to the fact that most member states already contributed to the predecessor missions of Concordia and EUFOR Althea (Allied Harmony and SFOR, respectively). Thus, in general the decision to deploy troops to the area of operation had already been taken before the launch of the CSDP missions. Regarding EUFOR Althea, all EU member and candidate states that contributed to EUFOR Althea had been already on the ground, deploying troops to SFOR. SFOR was to 80 per cent European.¹⁴ Overall, the alteration of troop contributing countries (TCC) between SFOR and EUFOR Althea was marginal; of 35 SFOR-countries 32 stayed in theatre. Beside the EU member states countries such as Canada, Chile and Turkey continued their participations. Only Australia, the USA and Denmark withdraw; Switzerland joined the now EU-led mission. A similar but not as dramatic picture applies to Concordia: nine EU member states and four candidate states – all of them NATO members – already had troops based in theatre prior to the launch of Concordia. They were joined by four members and six candidate states, none of them NATO members but all members of the Partnership for Peace.¹⁵ Both missions were and are conducted under the Berlin Plus agreements with NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe (DSACEUR) acting as operational commanders and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE, Belgium) functioning as operational headquarters.¹⁶ Both missions being handover missions deployed to a relative secure environment.

The high number of countries contributing can clearly be ascribed to the geopolitical closeness of the Balkan region. One declared strategic object of the EU is to build security in its neighbourhood referring to Europe's interest of well-governed countries on its borders.¹⁷ Regional stability and thus a safer neighbourhood is of high interest particularly as several new member states directly border with former Yugoslavia. As the Balkan is also a synonym for the failure of CSDP in the 1990s, an additional factor may be to amend errors made.

¹⁴ Keohane, D., 'EUFOR Althea', eds. G. Grevi, D. Helly and D. Keohane, *European Security and Defence Policy – The First 10 years*, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009, p. 214.

¹⁵ Partnership for Peace is a programme of bilateral cooperation between individual countries and NATO. For more information see NATO <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm>.

¹⁶ Under the Berlin Plus agreements (2003), NATO provides the EU access to NATO planning, a NATO European command is optional and the EU can draw on NATO assets and capabilities. For more information see European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of the Western European Union, 'EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreements', Assembly Factsheet No. 14, Nov. 2009, <http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/Fact%20sheets/14E_Fact_Sheet_Berlin_Plus.pdf?PHPSESSID=ad7ba3060e75d20eca30f2c9c9daaed>.

¹⁷ Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy*, 12 Dec. 2003, <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>>, p. 7.

Nowadays, the Balkans also became a prestige object for the EU – former High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union Javier Solana stated that “the credibility of our [Europe’s] foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there”.¹⁸ In 2008/2009 a new discussion concerning EUFOR Althea arose, the discussion about staying or withdrawing. EU member states such as Finland, France and Spain favoured the military withdrawal while for example Austria, the Netherlands and Slovakia spoke out for remaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁹

Operations to Africa, including EU NAVFOR Somalia have been largely characterized by France’s initiative and contributions (see figure 5, EU NAVFOR not included). Noticeable is that the majority of ‘new’ EU member states²⁰ contributed to a lesser degree to CSDP operations conducted in Africa, before and after gaining membership. Apart from Slovenia and Poland, new member states only provided minor contributions (1-4 personnel) to mission outside of Europe.²¹ Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia did not send any personnel to operations carried out in Africa.




Figure 5 Percentage of national contributions to CSDP operations in Africa

¹⁸ Council of the European Union (note 17), p. 8.
¹⁹ Keohane (note 14), p. 219.
²⁰ The new members states include Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia (2004) and Romania and Bulgaria (2007).
²¹ Romania initially pledged 120 troops to EUFOR Tchad/RCA but due to financial reasons retracted its force pledge.

III. Role individual member states play in CSDP

III.1 The role of the often-discussed Big 3

In the EU context the role of the so-called Big 3 is often highlighted. The Big 3 refers to France, Germany and the UK as the three largest and most powerful countries in the EU.

The driving force behind CSDP missions is undeniably France. France is major contributor – overall and at least for four of six EU operations. Apart from EUFOR Althea and EU NAVFOR Somalia, both having rotating leadership models, France was the framework nation for all other missions and it provided the force commanders on the ground each time. France ranks first in total number of military personnel (2009) in the EU and is second in European military expenditure (2002-2008), being besides the UK and Germany the biggest military power.²² It thus has the capacity to military act e.g. as a framework nation; however, more important France has also been interested and willing to act. From the beginning on France was involved in shaping CSDP, supporting and promoting CSDP “as a cooperative framework that would enable France to fulfill her national ambitious”.²³ Those ambitious are primarily reflected, but not limited to France engagement in Africa. France is the strongest supporter for CSDP mission. Regarding Africa, France alone contributed approximately 52 per cent of all EU military personnel deployed to the three CSDP land operations, followed by Ireland that was responsible for up to 10 per cent (see figure 5). All three theatres of operations – Chad, CAR and DRC – have close ties with France and are former colonies, respectively. However, it is also a part of France self-perception – taking on responsibility as “an issue of humanitarian duty and great power status”.²⁴ CSDP can be a vital instrument therefore and it can support France’s interest in expressing its leadership role. In the eyes of France “European ambition stands as a priority. Making the European Union a major player in crisis management and international security is one of the central tenets of our [French] security policy.”²⁵ A stronger CSDP means more autonomy from NATO and consequently for the US.

The strong commitment of the UK towards EU’s common foreign and security policy following the failure to efficiently response to the Balkan crisis in the 1990s was essential to succeed in implementing CSDP operations. In the first year, the UK contributed to operations such as Concordia and Operation Artemis despite the intra-EU dispute over the Iraq war in 2003. Regarding Operation Artemis, the UK was in fact the second largest contributor. However primarily, the UK sent troops to the CSDP operation EUFOR Althea, continuing its engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina beyond its deployment made to the NATO mission SFOR. Due to these contributions the UK ranks fifth in the total deployment statistic (see

²² For information on the total number of military personnel see International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 2003-2010*. Information on military expenditure see the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), <<http://milexdata.sipri.org/>> and EDA (note 11).

²³ Giegerich, B., *European Security and Strategic Culture* (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2006), p. 127.

²⁴ Giegerich (note 13), p. 120.

²⁵ French Presidency of the Republic, *The French White Paper on Defence and national Security (English Version)*, June 2008, p. 7.

figure 2). When the UK reduced its troop level to EUFOR Althea down to 21 in spring 2007, the UK as good as withdraw from CSDP operations. It did not contribute to EUFOR DR Congo and deployed only four personnel to the EUFOR Tchad/RCA force headquarters in Chad. A change occurred in 2008 when the EU agreed to send a maritime force off the coast of Somalia. The UK provided the operational headquarters, the operational commander and initially the Royal Navy contributed to the mission. In spring 2010, the UK contributes to the NATO's counter piracy mission (Operation Ocean Shield) not to EU NAVFOR. Throughout the British EU policy it is well known that the UK highly values the sovereignty of national governments.²⁶ Regarding military crisis management, it reserves the chance to act independently, in close cooperation with the US, e.g. through NATO and within the CSDP framework. The UK having a close relationship to the USA sees itself as a 'transatlantic bridge' between the EU and the USA. The UK seeks to avoid undermining NATO.

Germany that ranked third in total deployment numbers, close to second-ranking Italy, could claim that it deployed personnel to every CSDP operations—with significant contributions to EUFOR Althea, EUFOR DR Congo and EU NAVFOR Somalia. However, in detail Germany's commitment is less obvious: To Artemis Germany deployed around seven out of almost 2000 personnel and to EUFOR Tchad/RCA it only contributed to the operational headquarters staff in Mont Valérien, France.²⁷ Although Germany contributed up to 33 per cent to EUFOR DR Congo, provided the operational headquarters and the operational commander, it did not 'feel comfortable' being lead nation besides France. Germany did not approve the deployment of a battlegroup as consequently Germany would have had to provide the largest contingent of troops. It insisted on the area of operation in the capital Kinshasa instead of a deployment in the more vulnerable, conflict-ridden eastern regions of the DRC. Further, Germany requested a strict timeframe, which even due to delays in the second round of elections was not extended threatening the objects of the mission.²⁸ Only a small part of the total of about 750 German troops were at the end deployed in Kinshasa (DR Congo), the rest was stationed in neighbouring Gabon. This marks a clear sign of Germany's risk aversion approach towards military deployment – military means are the last resort.²⁹ Not only CSDP mission experience the reluctance of Germany to deploy to dangerous theatres. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) is also affected by Germany's caveats-charged engagement in crisis management operations. Although the German government deploys personnel to military operations abroad within the framework of EU, NATO and UN, it does not share the pro-active engagement of France

²⁶ For more information see Kupferschmidt, F., 'The United Kingdom between transatlantic relationship and European Integration: Pragmatism put to the test', SWP Working Paper, Mar. 2007.

²⁷ D. Helly reports of up to 35 German troops being deployed to Operation Artemis. Helly, D., 'Operation Artemis (RD Congo)', eds. G. Grevi, D. Helly and D. Keohane (note 14), p. 184. As the contributions to EUFOR Tchad/RCA are operational headquarters staff (France) they are not included in the statistics.

²⁸ Tull, D., M., 'EUFOR DRC: A success, but not a model', eds. M. Asseburg and R. Keppin, *The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence?*, SWP Research Paper, Dec. 2009, p.46-56.

²⁹ Alecu de Flers, N., CFSP Watch 2004 – Germany, FORTNET, <<http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%202004%20Germany.pdf>>, p. 1.

and the UK. Until now, Germany “has shown little inclination to become a driver for ESDP” and nothing indicates that this will change.³⁰

III.2 The role of other EU member states

It would be wrong to merely focus on the Big 3 as already the deployment numbers show. Apart from France, the UK and Germany, CSDP operations also relied to a larger extent on contributions made by Italy, Spain, Poland, the Netherlands and Austria – in absolute terms (see figure 2). As it is not possible to cover all actors within this paper the focus in the following sections will lie on representatives of the groups ‘contributing most’ such as Italy and Sweden and ‘contributing least’ such as the Czech Republic and Cyprus.

Italy has the fourth largest military forces in Europe. Over the last years, Italy has been one of the top contributors to multilateral conducted peace operations (EU, NATO and UN); e.g. in 2009 Italy of all EU member states ranked second behind the UK. It also places second in the overall top ranking of contributions to CSDP missions (see figure 2). Italy’s contributions “mirror [its] willingness to affirm its importance within the alliances”.³¹ Italy contributed to every military CSDP operation with major contribution to EUFOR Althea and it additionally contributed to every NATO-led operations. Italy highly values its EU and NATO membership. The EU in particular “allow[s] Italy to take part in new and more complex forms of solidarity aimed at facing the risks and threats of the new strategic situation, which are not – or are only partially – covered by the NATO Treaty”, e.g. civilian crisis management operations.³² Areas of strategic interests are primarily the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Caucasus, North Africa, Horn of Africa, Middle East, and the Persian Gulf.³³ However, this does not imply that Italy regionally restricts its contributions to crisis management – operations should be conducted where needed.³⁴

Another ‘pro-active’ CSDP participant is Sweden. Although Sweden does not rank CSDP top ten, over the last six years it contributed to every military CSDP mission with a relatively high number of troops, e.g. it deployed around 80 combat troops to Operation Artemis and up to 230 troops to EUFOR Tchad/RCA. It also supported every civilian CSDP mission. Sweden is one of six EU member states that are not NATO members. It is member of the Partnership

³⁰ Brummer, K., ‘European’s defence leadership: Why the Big Three won’t be enough’, *Europe’s World*, Dossier Security and Defence, Summer 2007, <<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/20823/Default.aspx>>.

³¹ Di Camillo, F. and Marta, L., ‘National Security Strategies: The Italian Case’, Real Instituto Elcano, WP 29/2009, 20 Oct. 2009. <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/DT39-2009>.

³² Nones, M. and Silvestri, S., *European Security and the Role of Italy*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 1 Sep. 2009, <<http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai0921.pdf>>, p. 1.

³³ Department of Defence, *The Chief of the Italian Defence Staff Strategic Concept*, 2008, <<http://www.difesa.it/NR/rdonlyres/7CF00FEA-D74E-4533-B3ED-9CCCD8B79E89/0/libroconcettostrategico.pdf>>.

³⁴ Comelli, M., ‘Crisis Watch 2005 – Italy’, FORNET, <<http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports2005/CFSP%20Watch%202005%20Italy.pdf>>, p. 8.

for Peace and contributes to NATO-led missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Sweden's engagement is based on the self-conception that international crisis management operations – under the framework of EU, NATO, OSCE and UN – are an integrated part of its foreign and security policy.³⁵ Sweden has a long tradition of participation in UN peace missions and is a strong supporter of the UN. Prioritizing effective multilateralism, Sweden works “for a Sweden with a stronger standing in Europe and a Europe with a stronger standing in the world”.³⁶ Sweden sees itself as an “active and solitary partner that contributes to stability and security in Europe and the world”.³⁷ Gunilla Herolf assesses that Sweden's history of “non-alignment is a strong reason for the Swedish interpretation of the ESDP to focus less on institutions and more on activities.”³⁸

Both the Czech Republic and Cyprus joined the EU in 2004; both contributed to a lesser degree to EU operations. In 2010 neither of them is contributing troops to CSDP operations' theatres. The Czech Republic contributed – as candidate state – to operations Concordia (around 2 personnel) and deployed troops – as member state – to EUFOR Althea (up to 90). It withdrew its contribution to EUFOR Althea in summer 2008. In both cases the Czech Republic already contributed to the NATO predecessors of the EU missions. In 2008/2009 the Czech Republic sent for the first time military staff to an operation in Africa, it contributed to EUFOR Tchad/RCA's force headquarters. Czech security policy is strongly NATO-orientated. At the end of 2009, the Czech Republic deployed almost all of its troops to NATO-led operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The Czech Republic perceives NATO as guarantee for its sovereignty. Similar to the UK, the Czech Republic supports a close EU/NATO cooperation with the intention to keep the USA military and politically engaged in Europe.³⁹ Geopolitical priorities are the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Middle East and Central Asia; it does not have interests in Africa.⁴⁰

Cyprus ranks 20th concerning the number of military personnel, but it has the lowest number of deployable land forces across EU member states.⁴¹ Since 2003 Cyprus has deployed military staff to EUFOR Congo and Operation Artemis, respectively.⁴² It also contributed to the operational headquarters of EUFOR Tchad/RCA in France and EU NAVFOR

³⁵ Swedish Government, *Nationell strategi för svenskt deltagande i internationell freds- och säkerhetsfrämjande verksamhet*, [National strategy for Swedish participation in international peace and security activities], 2007/08:51, <<http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/10/09/87/e611b8f5.pdf>>, pp. 5.

³⁶ Bildt, C., *Statement of Government Policy*, 17 Feb. 2010, <<http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/13/96/94/8a6b32fe.pdf>>, p. 1 and Swedish Government (note 35), p. 10.

³⁷ Swedish Government, *Sveriges säkerhetspolitik* [Swedish Security Policy], <<http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/10660>>.

³⁸ Herolf, G., 'Sweden and ESDP', ed. K. Brummer, *The North and ESDP* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007), p. 48.

³⁹ For detailed information see Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Defence, *Military Strategy of Czech Republic, 2008* <http://www.army.cz/assets/files/5819/The_Military_Strategy_of_the_Czech_Republic-2008.pdf>.

⁴⁰ Khol, R., 'CFSP Watch 2004 – Czech Republic', 2004, <<http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20Czech%20Republic.pdf>>, p. 6.

⁴¹ EDA (note 11)

⁴² Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Directorate, Cyprus – International Affairs* (2nd ed.), 2009, <[http://www.mod.gov.cy/mod/mod.nsf/All/F10C916F0B38242EC2257695002CC528/\\$file/cyprus%20-%20international%20affairs%20-%20security%20and%20defence.pdf](http://www.mod.gov.cy/mod/mod.nsf/All/F10C916F0B38242EC2257695002CC528/$file/cyprus%20-%20international%20affairs%20-%20security%20and%20defence.pdf)>.

Somalia in the UK. In the case of Artemis and EUFOR Congo, Cyprus contributed each time one personnel. Cyprus, being neither a member of NATO nor of the Partnership for Peace did not contribute to any CSDP mission in Europe as both missions were conducted under Berlin Plus. In 2005, an assessment looking at the official position of Cyprus on CSDP remarked that Cyprus has no military resources to offer to the CSDP missions.⁴³ The Cyprus Government sees itself restricted by the existing problems concerning the division of the island, but it seeks to reinforce CSDP at every opportunity.⁴⁴ Politically, Cyprus supports CSDP fully and it envisions its geostrategic position as an “advantage that can be used constructively to promote peace, security and stability in the region”.⁴⁵

Common approach? What's next?

EU crisis management operations are the product of an intergovernmental decisions making. Merely looking at the contributions made to military EU operations indicates that as a matter of fact operations are conducted by a ‘coalition of the willing’ – despite a unanimous approval. Although in general security threats and global challenges as outlined in the European Security Strategy can be retrieved in many national security documents, the motivation to finally actively support or not support EU crisis management operations – one aspect of CSDP – differs. Motivations that hamper a strong contribution to EU operations can vary: Some member states may prioritize contributing to operations carried out by other organizations, as it has happened in the cases of the Czech Republic and the UK. Member states may have no strategic interests in certain regions such as Africa. However, they do not hinder others willing to act to launch a CSDP mission as long as the mission does not contradict other interests (undermining NATO). Further, either due to limited capacity or national issues, member states are not capable to contribute more than a symbolic number to the missions if at all (Cyprus, Malta). Evident is also the partially ample difference of motives to act, which are quite difficult to single out and to assess, respectively. While e.g. France openly stresses its interest in Africa and sees CSDP as a tool to act autonomous from NATO, conducting international crisis management operations by itself is bedrock of Swedish foreign policy. Italy’s contributions may among others be based on their commitment towards the EU or other organizations to affirm its standing.

From an organizational point of view, seldom all member states of an organization contribute to a conducted operation. The problem of CSDP is that the EU remains far off its

⁴³ Melakopides, C. and Kentas, G., ‘CFSP Watch 2005 - Cyprus,’ FORNET, 2005, <<http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports2005/CFSP%20Watch%202005%20Cyprus.pdf>>, p. 4.

⁴⁴ Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Defence, ΟΜΙΛΙΑ ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΥ ΑΜΥΝΑΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΑΔΟΣΗ ΣΤΡΑΤΙΩΤΙΚΟΥ ΥΛΙΚΟΥ ΓΙΑ ΚΑΛΥΨΗ ΑΝΑΓΚΩΝ ΕΚΠΑΙΔΕΥΣΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΣΟΜΑΛΙΚΩΝ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΩΝ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΣ ΜΕΤΑ ΑΠΟ ΑΠΟΦΑΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΕΕ ΠΟΥ ΕΠΙΚΥΡΩΘΗΚΕ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑ 1863/2009 ΤΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟΥ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΣ ΤΩΝ ΗΝΩΜΕΝΩΝ ΕΘΝΩΝ [Speech regarding Training Needs of Somali Security Forces following the EU Decision endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1863], 31 Aug. 2009, <<http://www.mod.gov.cy/mod/mod.nsf/All/C8D3BCD88948CB79C2257623003AC0D9?OpenDocument&highlight=%CE%95%CE%A0%CE%91%CE%91>>.

⁴⁵ Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Defence (note 42), p. 1.

own goals. National engagements do not match the EU's ambitions to be "a global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security".⁴⁶ In 2008, France's and Belgium's suggestion to send an interim military operation in support of the UN Organization Mission in DR Congo (MONUC), the proposition was already backed up by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. The mission did not materialize as no mutual consent could be found. The EU has yet not made use of the battlegroups despite opportunities to deploy them and problems of force generation. The generation of troops has not been the only problem, often essential assets were lacking. Currently, the EU is heading towards CSDP light as Christopher Chivvis defines an EU that focuses on civilian-military missions – which face shortcomings too – and that additionally but infrequently carries out mission that include the use of force.⁴⁷ Pursuing this way, it will not necessarily empower the EU to act autonomous on security issues.

The French commitment to CSDP missions, as initiator and major troop contributor, has been essential to date. However, this engagement meets with criticism attributing France's commitment to secure national influence and interests. Despite this criticism it seems that EU operations in the near future will further have to rely to a great extent on France and thus on France's interests. It is not yet in sight that the UK or Germany will step in as 'framework nation'.

⁴⁶ European Union, General Affairs and External Relations Council, Headline Goals 2010, 17 May 2010, <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>>, p. 1.

⁴⁷ Chivvis, C. S., 'Birthing Athena – The Uncertain Future of European Defence and Security Policy', Focus stratégique, Institut Français des Relations Internationales Mar. 2008, <http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite_defense/Focus_strategique_5_Chivvis_PESD.pdf>, pp. 13.