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Did the Realist–Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History of International Relations

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Abstract

In the history of international relations, no single idea has been more influential than the notion that there was a 'great debate' in the 1920s and 1930s between the advocates of idealism and the champions of realism. In reality, there was never a single 'great debate' but rather a multiplicity of discussions which revolved around at least three big questions: does capitalism lead to war; what are the most effective ways of dealing with totalitarian state aggression; and (in the US), is retreat from entangling alliances a reasonable response to a world turned upside down by war and economic depression? Throughout this, the academic study of IR remained strongly liberal and internationalist in orientation. However, liberalism was never seriously challenged by an apolitical realism, but instead by socialist critics – at least in Britain – and isolationists in the United States. Ultimately, the persistence of the notion that there was a real debate between idealism and realism, which the latter apparently won, says less about the actual discussions of the time, and more about the marginalisation of liberal and normative thinking in the IR mainstream in the post-war period.

Keywords: *realism, idealism, liberal internationalism, the first 'Great Debate'*

Like all academic subjects, International Relations (IR) is heavily influenced by the historical narratives that make up the myths about the discipline's foundation and course. These narratives provide justifications for the present structure and goals of the discipline. Of all the events in IR's past perhaps the most crucial is the realist–idealist Great Debate of the 1930s and 1940s. It represents both a scientific coming of age, and the explanation for the dominance of realism after 1945. Yet, while IR specialists have often been able historians of the actual events of past international history, they have often proved rather lax in the study of the history of the ideas of their own discipline. Traditionally, the purpose of history within IR has been more as a source on which current theories can be applied, rather than as a means of studying where that history has come from.[1] Thus, the period of the 1930s has been treated more as a vindication of realist thought, and the disproving of idealism, rather than as the site of different ideas about the international sphere. Modern IR theorists have regarded the interwar period as the testing ground of modern realism, and thus they have tended to ignore the theoretical debates of the time. Instead they have imposed the view of an *arriviste* idealism, which is beaten off by the atemporal tenets of realism. The latter, in turn, are given new vigour by their reapplication to post-war international politics.

It is interesting to read the works on international affairs during the interwar years, for what emerges as the great debates within Britain especially (but in the

US and the Commonwealth too) is not the realist–idealist debate, but rather three other foreign policy debates. In the 1920s and early 1930s we find a debate over whether capitalism causes war; and following that there is the conflict between the appeasers and the advocates of collective security in Britain, and a parallel debate in the US between intervention and abstention in international affairs. Interwoven through these was the question of whether peaceful change was possible, and what form it should take. Throughout this, the academic study of IR remained strongly liberal. The picture within Britain is of a liberal internationalism threatened, not by realism but by the left, while American liberal internationalism appears threatened by isolationists rather than realists. Morgenthau mentions the international cooperation versus isolation debates of the 1920s, and the intervention versus abstention debates of the 1930s; while Frank M. Russell in 1936 saw the liberal proponents of international organizations in the US threatened both by absolutist pacifists and by isolationist nationalists.[2] The campaign of liberal internationalists during the interwar period was instrumental in, and spurred on by, occasional bouts of American intervention in world affairs, of which the Kellogg-Briand pact and the Washington Conference of 1921 were among the most successful. Certainly, James T. Shotwell saw the Kellog-Briand pact as a turning point in world affairs.[3] The conflict over appeasement within Britain represents part of what is commonly regarded as the realist–idealist debate, but the literature of the time, in fact, does not confirm the modern myth that appeasement was an idealist position.

The construction of a realist–idealist debate is important because it justifies the marginalization of liberal internationalism. The conventional wisdom in IR holds that idealism (associated with liberal internationalist ideas and writers) was beaten in a 'Great Debate' with realist thinkers such as Carr, Morgenthau and Niebuhr. An important part of the reason for their defeat at the hands of realism, the argument goes, was the failure of appeasement. This belief seems to unite both realist and anti-realist scholars. For Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff the 1930s saw 'a growing recognition among international relations teachers of the gap between the "utopians" and the "realists"', and Carr's work represents the best summation of this polarisation. Similarly, Michael Banks regards realism as the victor in a 1930s debate with idealism – the first 'Great Debate'. For Ann Tickner Morgenthau's political theory was a reaction to the '"legalistic-moralistic" or idealist approach to world politics which he [Morgenthau] claims was largely responsible for both the World Wars'. He 'laid the blame for the Second World War on the misguided morality of appeasement'. Also looking back to the 1930s, Steve Smith talks of failures in idealist thought, and that the 'response to the failure of idealism to explain the dominant events of the 1930s was the emergence, in good Kuhnian fashion, of an alternative paradigm, realism'. In a later publication, Smith refers to the commonly held view in IR that a debate occurred between realism and idealism 'in the late 1930's and early 1940's'. James Der Derian joined in this consensus when he interpreted realism as cast 'from idealism's failure to stop Hitlerism'. Finally, Chris Brown, in his 1997 textbook states that 'realism won the

first Great Debate' because 'it seemed to offer a more coherent and accurate account' of world affairs.[4]

Although well known and often quoted as a watershed event in IR, there seems little evidence that the realist–idealist debate ever occurred at all in the form in which modern IR writers suppose. Peter Wilson, taking a close reading of both Carr and his contemporary critics, has already reached a similar conclusion. Wilson correctly surmises that those people derided as utopians by Carr 'did not feel particularly devastated by [*The Twenty Years' Crisis*]'.[5] I intend to supplement and support Wilson's conclusion by taking a slightly different approach to the problem. There are three different cuts that can be made into the realist–idealist myth. One is to take it on its own terms, and examine what was actually said by the different authors who have been characterized as realist or idealist. I shall begin by examining what was said, on the one hand by Carr and Morgenthau, and on the other by Angell, Leonard Woolf and Alfred Zimmern. A comparison of these writers' works presents a very different picture of the relationship between realism and idealism. This cut is fundamentally a comparison of texts, in line with Carr's form of analysis in *Twenty Years' Crisis* (but lacking his violently pugnacious style). A second cut is to look at the 'fit' between what was said and the events of the 1930s, which puts the texts into the context of their period. Again, this paints a very different picture from the one found in the orthodox literature. Finally, a third cut would look at the academic writings of the period and ask if they perceived that a realist–idealist debate was going on, and if so, where was it?

Who said what to whom?

Realism, as a term in international relations, has come to mean many things, partially because those who call themselves realists cover a broad spectrum of thought. Carr and Morgenthau even differ on crucial points, but their reasons for opposing a particularly liberal/utopian view of the world do coincide. Niebuhr, in some of his arguments, comes close to some of their ideas, but the form of realism associated with C.A.W. Manning, Martin Wight and, later, Hedley Bull do not fit in so neatly with Carr and Morgenthau. This 'English school' was also not strongly critical of the liberal internationalist thinkers, and in fact Herbert Butterfield, who is often considered part of English school realism, was a frequent victim of Carr's criticisms. Suffice it to say that the realist component of the realist–idealist debate has traditionally centred on the two major realist criticisms of interwar liberalism penned by Carr and Morgenthau. Carr and Morgenthau, on much of what they wrote, do not sit well together, yet on their reasons for criticizing liberal internationalist IR, Carr and Morgenthau find common ground. Realist, in the context of the discussion of this debate, therefore, refers to the critical realism associated with Carr and Morgenthau's attacks on liberalism.

Much the same can be said of the term idealism, which adds little to our

understanding of the history of the academic discipline, but does add a hint of confusion by using a term most frequently used in Political Science to describe the school of philosophy associated with Kant and Hegel. This situation is made more complex by the fact that Carr never used the term idealism, but rather dismissed his rivals as utopians. Yet, the vast bulk of the people who were criticized by Carr and Morgenthau, and who later appeared as footnotes to the rogue's gallery of idealists in later IR textbooks, did share something in common. They were all some form of liberal, and frequently they were social liberals or social democrats. Despite this, the ideas of the so-called idealists cover such a range of different ideological, methodological and epistemological approaches that the use of the blanket term idealist is, from a theoretical point of view, unhelpfully broad, and consequently an indefinable term. The 'idealists' as a group just share too little in common.

Although Carr, in *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, was criticizing a mode of thought, rather than particular authors, he often quoted Norman Angell as a prime example of the utopian thought he sought to criticize. Indeed, in a later work, Carr singled out Angell, along with Comte and Buckle, as the most typical representatives of the utopian obsession with the supremacy of the intellect.[6] Angell, along with Alfred Zimmern, was the most often quoted 'utopian' writer on international affairs in *The Twenty Years' Crisis*. The main thrust of Carr's attack was on the view that a natural harmony of interests existed between all people.

According to Carr the political corollary to the idea that moral laws can be established by right reasoning is the concept that in following right reason the individual serves the rest of the community, and the community serves the interests of the individual. Clashes of interest, therefore, are seen as the result of the incorrect calculation of interests by one or more of the conflicting parties. This is the 19th-century liberal doctrine of the harmony of interests.[7] Thus, the basic elements of the idea of the harmony of interests is of a common directional reason and of the power of the intellect to inform us of our true interests. Against these Carr placed the 'realist' conception of the relativity of thought.

The idea that thought is relative to circumstance has gained much ground in IR, not only from the critical-realist approaches of Carr and the early Morgenthau, but now from Marxism, critical theory and post-structuralism. In his criticism of the harmony of interests Carr went further than Kant's argument that circumstance 'clouds' reasoned judgement, arguing that thought is often directed to the purposes of the thinker. Thus, rational argument can be a cloak for the fulfilment of a political agenda. Carr quotes the cases of British opposition to privateering and the submarine, pointing out that Britain's argument that these weapons were uncivilized masked the fact that privateers and submarines were also the weapons of the weak.[8] A similar case today might be made about the modern Western opposition to the use of mustard gas and terrorism by poorer states, in the face of the contemporary Western possession of nuclear weapons and long-range bombers.

Certainly, Norman Angell's *Great Illusion*, written before the First World War,

is full of arguments that in fact benefited the British and American positions as status quo powers. Angell supported Western colonialism and the American Western expansion because he believed that it contributed to the development of human interdependence. Previously these parts of the world were 'under-utilized' by their 'war-prone' inhabitants, but by taking over the territory, Angell argued, the Westerner integrated new peoples into the materially more efficient global economic system, and also provided, at great expense, the mechanisms for providing peace among these previously warring peoples.[9] Angell was able to think this way because he believed in one common form of human utilitarian reason, which was capable, when unhindered by irrational passions, of leading people on the same single path of historical evolution. Thus, by colonizing 'backward' peoples Westerners were not disturbing a civilization's separate development, but merely giving these peoples the economic and policing structures that they would have developed in time anyway.

Not long after Carr, Hans Morgenthau wrote a stinging attack against liberal internationalism, quoting Angell as one of many modern liberal internationalists. According to Morgenthau the main failure of the liberal internationalism to which Angell subscribed was that it reversed the relationship between power and reason. Angell (I) had assumed that the power of reason had led to the slow development of a more rational society, in which the pugnacious use of power was slowly eliminated. Morgenthau argued, instead, that it was the imposition of powerful sovereign institutions that allowed internationalist principles to operate, but only so far as the writ of that sovereign authority extended. Thus, the centralized liberal state allowed rational principles of law and justice to operate domestically. Internationally, however, questions of sovereign authority had not been settled, and as a consequence, questions of rational justice were irrelevant, as the prior question of how power should be distributed and exercised had not been settled. International politics was dominated by questions of power relations, and not by questions of the right way to live.[10] Thus, Morgenthau was less concerned with creating a rationally-inspired perpetual peace among states, than he was with preserving peace by balancing competing powerful interests.[11]

The upshot of the realist argument against the existence of a commonality of interests at the international level is that peace between states can only be maintained by a balance of power. Disputes over relative power shares, they claim, make up most of the conflicts at the international level, and there is no intrinsic harmony of interests – even between liberal states. Peace, according to these realists, can best be preserved by maintaining a balance between interests. The belief in a freely arrived at collective security between all states is based on the illusion that each state's security interests are the same, when in fact security interests are formed by concerns of relative power.

To Morgenthau the balance of power was not the opposite of collective security, as it was in Angell's thought, but a natural part of human society. The peculiar nature of the balance of power between nations was the result of the anarchical, amoral, and unsettled power relations found at the international

level.[12] Carr, on the other hand, saw the potential for a collective security regime, on the condition that it both appealed to the interests of the great powers and was able to work through functional organizations that bypassed the selfishness of the state.[13]

Yet, there is a major flaw in the criticism's of Norman Angell by Carr and Morgenthau. Carr's almost total reliance on the pre-First World War works of Angell ensured that he missed many of the new twists in Angell's thought, while Morgenthau's much broader attack on liberal internationalism failed to take account of how much Angell's post-war work differed from 19th-century liberalism. Angell's post-1918 ideas, because they deal with the non-rational in human thought and the need for reforms to the international system, have a particular relevance to the realist critiques of Angell's liberal internationalism. In addition, and almost completely ignored by realist scholars, Norman Angell, Leonard Woolf, Richard Coventry and Alfred Zimmern did write replies to Carr's *Twenty Years' Crisis*. In fact, Woolf's dissection of Carr's realist argument was comprehensive and in places devastating. It is interesting to note that in *Nationalism and After*, written six years after *Twenty Years' Crisis*, Carr moved beyond his realist critique, and advocated a functional (in the Mitranian sense) solution to the world's problems.

Perhaps the idea that most separates the realist from much of interwar liberal internationalism is the question of the relationship between intellect and human nature. Carr and Morgenthau had caricatured liberal internationalism as fundamentally ignoring human nature, and assuming that the intellect was dominant. This is certainly not true, even in the writings of Angell before the First World War. Angell was well aware of the power of human nature, but he had argued that the failings of human nature could be rectified by the intellect, since human behaviour was affected by both instinct and reason. Leonard Woolf, in his reply to Carr, argued that our behaviour was not determined primarily by instinct, as the realists claimed, but 'by a complicated process in which reason, instincts, desires, and emotions interact'.[14] In a similar vein, Mitrany argued in 1933 that it was less human nature, but the more malleable habits, that were behind human action, although he saw a certain continuity in human practice as a result of a common human nature.[15] Mitrany never specified what the relationship should be between habit and nature, but the idea of a mix is strongly present. Thus, what the liberal internationalists were actually saying was that the intellect had the *potential* to modify our behaviour, so that behaviour did not have to rely on the instincts and emotions of human nature alone.

The idea of the superiority of the intellect led, in Carr's view, to the idea of the harmony of interests. This harmony was based on a conception of a common utilitarian instrumental reason, and, according to Morgenthau, liberal internationalists put reason ahead of power, when in fact it was power that allowed reason to exist. While the early Angell did use the harmony of interests frequently, the post-1918 Angell did not. True, Angell advocated an international rule of law and collective security. Yet, this was less because he saw a natural harmony of

interests between states and individuals, but rather because he recognized that interests were not harmonious, and thus would lead to war if they were not dealt with through other means. In reaction to Carr's accusation of following the harmony of interests, Angell stated in his 1940 reply to *The Twenty Years' Crisis* that the choice was really between allowing individual interests to sort themselves out, as Carr and the appeasers advocated, and collective action that used the power of the community to resolve or channel these interests into less destructive forms of conflict.[16]

Woolf was even stronger in his language, effectively accusing Carr of setting up a straw man with the notion of the harmony of interests. Woolf pointed out that the existence of the League was, itself, a recognition by internationalists that a disharmony of interests, which needed to be mediated by international organizations, existed.[17] Yet, behind the writing of Angell and Woolf was an assumption that, through the exercise of reason, a cooperative international society could be created. Thus while in the short term they rejected the idea of the existence of a harmony of interests, there was a sense in which they believed in the ability of reason, through the intellect, to create some form of harmony. Thus, while Carr's criticism over the harmony of interests was flawed, there was a grain of truth in his statement. It is important to point out, however, that other so-called idealists, H.N. Brailsford, Harold Laski and David Mitrany among them, would also have criticized Angell and Woolf for this faith in rationalism.

Behind the criticism of the harmony of interests lies the question of whether it is power that allows reason to exist, or whether it is reason that is capable of using power to create a better world. Here the difference of opinion between realists and liberal internationalists is simultaneously at its most acute and its most unresolvable, in the sense that we are dealing with assumptions about human nature and its connection to the intellect in the determination of human action. Realism posits the simplest view, where the laws of human nature determine human behaviour, and the intellect can be used to justify or analyse those actions afterwards. Liberal internationalism – going back to Kant – has a more complex relationship, where both human nature and human intellect effect action. Education, experience and other forces external to human nature can increase the role of the intellect in the determination of human nature, thus limiting the effects of nature. The all-too-frequent possibility still exists in liberal internationalist thought that people will not use their intellect properly, thus the realist notion of a nature-determined political realm – a realm of struggle – forms part of the liberal internationalist interpretation, albeit a representation of the world we have to move away from.

Ironically, both Morgenthau's realism and Angell's liberal internationalism can be attacked for their definitions of human nature, although because realism relies on this concept more heavily, it obviously comes off worse. Human nature as a determinant of action is in fact a circular argument. We observe human actions, see a tendency in them, and call that trend human nature. We then proceed to say that human nature determines (or influences in the liberal internationalist case)

action. Thus action defines nature determines action. This obvious weakness in the Morgenthau canon, and in the social Darwinist approaches which also focused in on the determining role of human nature, has led many later realists to move realism away from this position. Waltz abandoned the conception of a standard human nature, only to reinvent it in the form of a common and knowable nature of states.[18] In fact, unlike the realism of the early Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Carr, the tendency in late 20th-century realism was to equate realism not with arguments about the determining role of human nature, but with a conception of states as dominant international actors that behave in a similar way under set laws of history. As a result, current forms of realism have lost the one grounding principle that explains why atemporal laws of history are able to exist. Realism has yet to sort out this intellectual weakness, and consequently Morgenthau's conception of human nature remains the implicit basis of realism.

Perhaps, though, it is the realist assumption that we cannot use our ability to learn to change the 'laws of history' under which we are meant to operate that is the most damning of it, and the most supportive of liberal internationalism. Although, it should be added that Carr and Morgenthau, in the final analysis, did accept the ability to learn as a potential source of change, despite their pessimistic conclusions about our inability to escape certain laws of behaviour. Change, to them, had to occur within the bounds of laws established by human nature, although their prescriptions, as we have seen above, often bore a striking resemblance to so-called idealist plans. The realist notion of the universality of the balance of power, and of cyclical reoccurrence in history, assumes that all the intellect is good for is getting a better understanding of the constants of human behaviour. This, of course, flies in the face of the very human experience that realists claim to be masters at understanding. In fact, the intellect is often used to alter behaviour in such a way as to minimize conflict. For example, Woolf saw three different ways to react to a situation in which conflict is endemic. The first, and realist, way is to leave things as they are and let the strongest prevail (or not, of course, if a successful balance of power operates). The second, associated with the League, is to change the nature of the conflict by imposing rules that regulate the disputes. The third way is to alter the conditions that created the dispute. To illustrate this point Woolf asks us to imagine people trying to get home on the bus during a London rush hour. There are not quite enough buses to handle the rush, so if the situation was left as it was then people would fight and push their way on to the bus in a disorganized fashion. In fact, this does not happen because, in line with the second scenario, people have imposed their own rules, and they will queue in an orderly fashion – the first at the bus stop is the first to get on the bus. Finally, Woolf argues, we could solve the whole problem permanently if, consistent with the third scenario, more buses were put on that route.[19]

As well as pointing out that we learn, and use our learning to alter our behaviour and social structures, the liberal internationalism associated with Angell also stressed the importance of our ideas about reality, rather than reality itself, as the basis of our actions. Woolf's example of Londoners spontaneously queuing in

an orderly fashion, rather than throwing themselves at the buses in a free-for-all, stands as an anecdotal example of a crucial point left out of the realist epistemology. Realism seeks to ground reality in power relations, but as Angell had pointed out, in his unconscious Gramscian turn, it is not power that is important *per se*, but rather the ideas that guide that power. Angell's argument about the slave society, where the power of the slaves in real terms is stronger than that of their masters, yet the slaves through their ideas of their place in society forge their own chains,[20] acts as a criticism of power as the basis of society. This conception of intellectual hegemony is also a better explanation of the lead-up to the Second World War, in which the more powerful West allowed the fascist dictators to flourish, largely because they had forged their own chains in the form of a belief in the power of appeasement, and the ultimately peaceful nature of Italy, Japan and Germany.

Realism, in the form it took in the 1930s and 1940s does not, therefore, represent a successful critique of liberal internationalism. If anything, much of what passes for realism in this case is a combination of some conservative ideas about struggle and liberal conceptions of human nature without liberal notions of the place of human nature in the determination of action. The question emerges, therefore, why did realism displace liberal internationalism as the dominant paradigm in IR? One argument that has been made by many modern 20th-century scholars is that the theories of the idealists (liberal internationalists) had failed to halt the advance of fascism, while the arguments of the realists proved to be correct.[21] Liberal internationalism, in sum, has been accused of aiding and abetting appeasement.

Who were the appeasers?

There is really very little to support this argument. In fact, it was the supporters of appeasement who were opposed to liberal internationalism, and Carr's attack on utopianism in 1939 was, rather, a belated defence of Chamberlain's failed policy to placate Germany before and during the Munich agreement. It is often instructive to read those passages that Carr cut out of later editions of *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, including:

> If the power relations of Europe in 1938 made it inevitable that Czecho-Slovakia should lose part of its territory and eventually her independence, it was preferable . . . that this should come about as the result of discussions round a table in Munich.[22]

> The negotiations which led up to the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, were the nearest approach in recent years to the settlement of a major international issue by a procedure of peaceful change. . . . The change in itself was one which corresponded both to a change in the European equilibrium of forces and to accepted canons of international morality.[23]

Carr took the line – which was a generally accepted maxim of the appeasement period – that unsatisfied powers were a threat to global order only if they remained unsatisfied, but as they got more of what they want they soften their views, and 'acquire the vested interest in peace'.[24] This, of course was not a universal 1930s realist position. Morgenthau certainly believed that the Nazis were rearming for war, while Niebuhr opposed the Munich agreement.[25] Yet, Morgenthau, for all that, was not a vocal opponent of fascism, and his actions and friendships during his time in Spain, just before and during the outbreak of the Civil War, reveal an ambivalence to fascism at variance with his personal disgust with the Nazis. Where Carr is guilty of supporting appeasement, Morgenthau is innocent, but he was, like most of his contemporaries, not particularly active in opposing fascism either. Carr, however, was not the only realist to sympathize with German aims, and thus to be inclined to support appeasement. Kennan, in 1940, definitely equated realism with policies that aimed at working with the Germans. In one of his dispatches from Prague, this one dated October 1940, when many anti-fascist Czechs were fighting alongside Commonwealth forces in the crucial Battle of Britain, Kennan attacked those '[i]rresponsible Czechs, both within and without the confines of the Protectorate [of Bohemia-Moravia]' who opposed German rule. Kennan's praise was reserved for the Czech leaders who worked for Czech interests within the government of the Protectorate – in other words the collaborators.[26] Along similar lines, and in an earlier dispatch, Kennan compared the rump Czecho-Slovak state to the pro-Axis Schuschnigg regime in Austria. Kennan did not necessarily see this vassal status for Czecho-Slovakia as being a necessarily bad thing in the circumstances.[27] Thus, for both Carr and Kennan realism meant recognizing the realities of German power, and thus not idealistically and unconditionally opposing it. That this policy of appeasing Germany ultimately led to ruin and near disaster demonstrates the potential unreality of following a 'pragmatic' approach that recognizes the realities of current power relations. That the advocates of *realpolitik* were split in the late 1930s about what to do about Germany – with Morgenthau and Churchill (belatedly) calling for opposition to Hitler; and Carr, Kennan and Chamberlain supporting the establishment of a working relationship – demonstrates that realism as a way of thinking did not provide the answers to the twenty years' crisis.

In fact, we might say that the true realism is to be found among those who sought to oppose fascism, rather than to accept its existence as a reality, and argued that the world must change if international peace and freedom were to be achieved. (An argument along these philosophical lines has been made by Brian Barry, who regards the search for a system of greater justice as realistic; since humans are motivated by a sense of justice, as much as by self-interest. Indeed, Barry links the pursuit of justice for humans with self-interest through the need for justification of our actions, and thus a 'truer realism' might be defined as a recognition of the importance of justice in human life.[28] This seems to come closer to the realism of Hedley Bull, where justice and power are not necessarily opposites.) Admittedly, some of the reformers of international affairs were just as

guilty of allowing the spread of fascism as were the realist appeasers. Quintin Hogg's eloquent reply to the Labour critics of the Conservative Party's appeasement policy points out that many opponents of Chamberlain spent the period of appeasement advocating spending less money on armaments. Hogg, a supporter of collective security, argued that without arms at its disposal Britain would not have been able to contribute to an early anti-fascist front at all.[29] The problem was that much of the opposition to Conservative foreign policy during this period was effective at demonstrating fault, but defective at offering alternatives.[30] Perhaps Harold Nicolson summed it up best when he received a letter from a constituent that asked him if he stood for the League of Nations and collective security, but against European entanglements. Nicolson's shock at this oxymoron was heightened when he read the letter at various meetings, only to find that his audiences rarely saw it as self-contradictory.[31]

While accusations of passively allowing the spread of fascism can be levelled at some of the leftist and liberal opponents of Chamberlain's policies, it would be unfair to lay those accusations at the feet of liberal internationalists like Angell. Angell's opposition to the dictators dates from at least 1931, when his support for collective security led him to argue, during the Manchurian crisis, that if the defence of collective security and the League against Japanese aggression risked war, then it was a risk worth taking.[32] As soon as the Nazis rose to power, Angell was arguing that Hitler was 'promising to rearm the country, to hit back at his enemies, to indulge historic hates, to badger Jews'.[33] Angell also advocated action under the auspices of the League against Italy's invasion of Abyssinia,[34] and throughout this period he remained critical of the British policy of appeasement towards the fascist states that, he believed, would still threaten British security however much they were appeased.[35] British security would rely on the upholding of the law through alliances with other like-minded states, even if the League was to be discredited, a League-like association would be needed to oppose Germany.[36]

Certainly, Angell was not alone. H.N. Brailsford recognized fascism as a threat in 1933, and listed the liberation of Germany from Nazi tyranny as one of the goals of a future British socialist foreign policy.[37] Within academic IR, Alfred Zimmern was highly critical of the policy of the great powers during the Manchurian and Abyssinian crises.[38] Indeed, Zimmern blamed the lack of international solidarity amongst the status quo powers for their failure to check the aggressive designs of the dictators. The choice, as Zimmern was to put it later, was between two forms of power. Either we choose the irresponsible power of the dictators as the principle of international life, or the responsible power of (international) government.[39] Opposition to Nazi policy can also be found in the writings of Leonard Woolf, Konni Zilliacus, David Mitrany and other writers later branded as idealists.

The debate that never happened

Thus far we have seen how the realist critique of liberal internationalism was not as damning as the IR mythology believes, nor were the events of the 1930s a vindication of realism and a repudiation of that branch of liberal internationalism associated with Angell, Woolf, Zimmern and others. Having taken this revisionist history of IR thus far, it only remains to take the final step, and argue that the 'Great Debate' between realism and idealism in fact has little to do with liberal internationalism at all, least of all with the ideas of Angell and Mitrany, and far more to do with tensions within realism itself. To put the issue more forthrightly, the realist–idealist debate never happened.

The first point to make is that, for a 'Great Debate', there is virtually no discussion in IR and political science journals on the relative merits of realism and idealism. *International Affairs*, which often included contributions from Mitrany and Carr does not mention the debate in the 1930s and 1940s, while the *Political Quarterly* – under the editorship of Leonard Woolf, limits it to a reply to Carr written by Woolf in 1940.[40] *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, which was otherwise very concerned about what should be taught in international politics classes, not only does not mention a debate, it never bothered to print a review of *Twenty Years' Crisis*.[41] Equally silent are *International Conciliation*, *Journal of Politics* and *Political Science Quarterly*. Even Georg Schwarzenberger's *Power Politics*, written in 1941, makes no reference to a raging debate. The same is true of Nicholas Spykman's 1942 book *American Strategy in World Politics*.

That there was no realist–idealist debate within the United States prior to 1936 is clear from Frank M. Russell's *Theories of International Relations*. Russell's summary of the field, as it was taught in the United States, demonstrates the extent to which liberal internationalism was the dominant creed, and that there was a strong sense that the old 19th-century ideas of the absolute right of sovereign states to be judge and jury in their own cases was no longer feasible. Russell did, however, accept that the old narrow nationalist creed had a certain amount of support amongst many policy-makers.[42] Even American scholars, who have been claimed for the realist tradition by later generations, do not come out as realists at this time. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, in their 1990 survey of IR, claim Frederick L. Schuman for the realist tradition, on the grounds that he saw state safety as ultimately resting on power.[43] Yet, Schuman's thought actually comes closer in approach to Angell's on further inspection. For example, his criticism of the Kellogg-Briand pact rested on his argument that peace could only be accomplished by altering people's 'traditional attitudes and values which have bred war in the past and will breed war (by another name) in the future'.[44] The similarity with Angell's concept of the public mind, and the view that ideas can change human behaviour, distances Schuman from Morgenthau's notion of human nature.

It is even problematic, as Robin Lovin has pointed out, to place Niebuhr within

the realist tradition in IR. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, who take the conventional IR road of classifying Niebuhr as a realist, admit to the importance in Niebuhr's thought of the tempering of realism with morality.[45] Indeed, as Lovin argues, what distances Niebuhr from IR realism is his moral realism – his strong belief in absolute moral values, and of the potential of people to follow those values.[46] This leads Niebuhr to discuss the moral worth of different coercive acts, and from that, to a conception of political cooperation between social classes and national interests that would help to eliminate immoral force.[47] This has much more in common with the arguments put forward by the pro-League activists than it does with Morgenthau's moral relativism.

A similar case is offered by another American Writer, Frederick Sherwood Dunn, who, while claimed for realism after the Second World War, occupies an equivocal position in the late 1930s. Dunn regarded the current, interwar, international system as characterized by conflicts over power, yet here his affinity with realism ends. Like many of the liberal internationalists he regarded this as a substandard situation in need of reform. For Dunn the problem was that a self-help international system leads to the means (power) becoming the ends. Dunn, like Angell, argues for the importance of building up international institutions, and goes so far as to contradict Morgenthau by claiming that it is 'possible to exaggerate the importance of power considerations in determining the course of international events' and that it 'may be anticipated that nations will gradually place more confidence in these institutions and less in their own strength, thereby reducing power politics'.[48]

In fact, it is not until the 1940s that we can talk about a realist academic community emerging in the United States. Although Spykman's 1942 book has been referred to above as having no mention of a debate, we do see in his writings something approaching the realism we associate with Morgenthau. While Spykman meets Dunn and Niebuhr half-way by accepting that power is a means towards ethical ends, he qualifies this by arguing that struggle over power is basic to life, and therefore cannot be eliminated. Rather, the work of civilization is to remove that conflict from the battlefield and channel it into less bloody arenas. Similar ideas emerge at the same time from Brooks Emeny and W.T.R. Fox.[49] It has to be repeated, however, that these ideas are emerging during the Second World War, and are not written as attempts to engage any of the liberal internationalist writers of the previous decade. Indeed, these writers did not even call themselves realists. Their interest in balancing power with ethics does, however, come closer to a debate within realism during the 1950s, in which the issue of the comparative weight of interests and ethics within realism was heatedly discussed.

Something of the flavour of a realist–idealist debate does emerge in the International Studies Conferences held in Paris and London between 1934 and 1935. Here, views of human nature and national interest, not that dissimilar from what we associate with realism, were advocated by an Italian participant. In fact, Gilbert Murray, in his Presidential Address, reserved more than a page to a

criticism of these ideas.[50] The important point here, however, is that Signor Coppola's 'realism' was in a minority of one, and was the opinion of an academic from a fascist country. Coppola's opinions were not his alone, however, nor were they unknown in the democratic West. Frank Russell quotes an American senator having similar attitudes in a speech in New York in 1934, although Russell sees these 'extreme nationalists' as representative of an old and self-defeating creed.[51] Yet, to see Russell's senator and Signor Coppola as representatives of a pre-1939 realism may be a misapplication of hindsight. Rather, these advocates of national interest represent a 20th-century continuation of the social Darwinist ideas of the late 19th century. Social Darwinism, unlike late 20th-century realism, advocated war and state conflict as a way of maintaining the strength and vitality of civilization.[52]

A second mention of realism and idealism seems to emerge between 1936 and 1937, where realism is associated with people who are opposed to the idea of international governance through international organizations. The League suffered a series of defections in the 1930s, of which the most damaging were Japan in 1931, Germany in 1933 and Italy in 1937. Realism became associated with those who sought to abandon the League, and move towards a more 19th-century conference system. This was later to evolve into the policy of appeasement. Those who still supported collective security under the League were often called idealists. It has to be pointed out, however, that this name-calling never seemed to reach the level of academic discourse prior to Carr's use of realism in 1939. Indeed, for Salvador de Madariaga, writing in 1938, realism is an atavistic and non-intellectual attempt to return to the pre-First World War diplomacy, which fails to recognize the changes in international politics that had come about since 1914.[53]

Indeed, this 'realism' found its most clear embodiment in David Low's fictional cartoon character, Colonel Blimp. Blimp's dislike of the League, and his jingoistic support for narrow British concerns, is put in direct opposition to Low's own support for collective security against fascism. Blimp, from the safety of his Turkish bath, wishes to weaken the League, and replace it with an accommodation with Germany. Although a caricature, Blimp represents the faulty realism of the anti-League Conservatives around Neville Chamberlain. In fact, it is probably fair to say that it was the late 1930s realists who made the League unworkable through their inactivity. Once they had 'murdered' the League, these same realists supported appeasement as a conservative non-internationalist alternative to collective security.[54] The weakness of the League, in sum, was a product of the lack of will among anti-internationalist 'realists' within the foreign policy establishments of the great powers, such as Britain. After they had discredited the League by their inaction, they hoped to establish peace through agreements with the dictators. When the failure of this policy became clear, after the German occupation of Prague in 1939, the appeasers had to rebuild the very collective security they had spent the last eight years demolishing.

The important thing here is that, prior to Carr, realism was the name that those who opposed the collective security arrangements of the League called them-

selves. Carr, and then Morgenthau, took this time-bound and non-intellectual position, and gave it a metaphysics. Certainly, the academic realism of the 1940s shares much with the foreign policy realism of the mid-1930s – most obviously their obsession with what is, not what can be. Yet, while academic realism came to be an argument about the relation between order and right in an anarchical world of states, mid-1930s realism was the last stand of a 19th-century nationalist foreign policy, that was opposed to the interference of international institutions.

Locating the realist–idealist debate

So what is left of the attempt to locate a realist–idealist debate in the 1930s and early 1940s? First, there are the criticisms of liberalism in Carr and Morgenthau, and the replies to Carr from, amongst others, Angell, Woolf and Zimmern. This literature is vastly smaller than both the 'does capitalism cause war' debate of the early to mid-1930s, and the flurry caused by Angell's *Great Illusion* before 1914. Second, we have an amorphous dispute between pro- and anti-Leaguers during the crises over Manchuria, Abyssinia and the Sudetenland, in which a lack of will among democratic leaders to deal with aggression is associated with the term realism. This latter dispute is never presented at the time as a debate. Rather, realism and idealism become terms of abuse that are exchanged between commentators on foreign affairs.

The possibility remains that the realist–idealist dichotomy has little to do with a disagreement between liberal internationalists and realists in the 1930s and 1940s, but is actually a product of the nature of post-1945 realism, and its interaction with a predominantly liberal domestic sphere within the minds of realist scholars themselves. Indeed, most IR realists have been domestic liberals, and have stressed that different criteria apply to different political realms. That 'idealism' is the 'other' that occurs not outside, but inside realism, has been argued by both Robert Webber and Peter Wilson.[55] In effect, the realist concern about the relationship between politics and ethics – that nagging doubt that there is more to life than disputes over relative power – has squeezed out the earlier liberal internationalist concerns about the evolution of global governance.

In fact, the very nature of realism, in the many forms it has taken, sets up the conditions for the reification of idealism from realism. Realists often contrast the idea of universal ethics and justice with the problem of living in a world of competing power relations. Niebuhr's conception of politics, for example, was as 'an area where conscience and power meet'.[56] Thus, the reality of politics for the realist is the clash between an optimistic idealism and a pessimistic realism. In Hedley Bull this translates into a continually changing (sometimes conflictual, sometimes complementary) interaction between justice and order. On another tack, Arnold Wolfers has stressed the crucial need for synthesis between a 'realism' that 'is primarily interested in the quest for power' and an idealism that seeks to promote a universal principle to eliminate power relations.[57]

What we have here is probably three different issues which have become fused. First, the realist–idealist dichotomy is a post-Second World War discussion within realism about the relationship between power politics and a universal morality. Second, realism is a not wholly satisfying criticism of liberal internationalism by Carr and Morgenthau. Third, realism and idealism are terms that were used in popular discussions of the role of the League in foreign policy. Unfortunately, these three separate issues have become confused, and the splits and anxieties associated with the realist attempts to come to terms with their relations towards universal ethics have combined with an earlier rejection of the League of Nations system of collective security.

What this suggests is that realism is not a product of a successful defence against Hitler, but rather a child of the Cold War. In fact, given the attitudes of those who called themselves realists in the mid-1930s, modern realists might do well to ignore them. Yet, in choosing to parade Carr and Morgenthau as heroes, modern realist IR has marginalized an earlier generation that had understood the dangers inherent in fascism. The works of Konni Zilliacus, Norman Angell, Harold Laski, H.N. Brailsford, Leonard Woolf, Alfred Zimmern and J.A. Hobson have all found dishonourable graves in footnotes to the realist ascendancy – while that apology for appeasement, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, continues to grace the pages of the IR syllabus. In the end I concur with Wilson, when he argues that the great damage caused by this myth of a first 'Great Debate' has been to over-simplify the nature of IR in the interwar period, and to close off avenues of research that were too closely identified with the thinkers that were labelled idealists.[58]

Notes

For a more detailed discussion of some of the issues raised here see my *Creating International Studies: Angell, Mitrany and the Liberal Tradition* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999). Many of the revisions to my original argument have been prompted by discussions with David Long and Sean Molloy, and by Peter Wilson's work on the same subject.

1   Exceptions do abound, however. See, for example, Long and Wilson (1995) *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed*. Oxford: Clarendon; William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom (1991) *International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation*. London: HarperCollins.

2   Hans J. Morgenthau (1952) 'Another "Great Debate": The National Interest of the United States', *American Political Science Review* 46(4): 961; Frank M. Russell (1936) *Theories of International Relations*. New York: Appleton-Century. For the domination of liberal internationalism in Britain and the United States see chapter 4 of Groom and Olson, *International Relations* (see note 1).

3   See James T. Shotwell (1929) *War as an Instrument of National Policy and its Renunciation in the Pact of Paris*. London: Constable.

4   James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff (1990) *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, pp6–7. New York: Harper and Row; Michael Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate' in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom (1985) *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory*, p10. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner; J. Ann Tickner (1988) 'Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17(3): 433; Steve Smith (1987) 'Paradigm Dominance in International

Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 16(2): 192; Steve Smith, 'The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory' in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds) (1995) *International Relations Theory Today*, p14. Oxford: Polity; James Der Derian, 'Introduction: Critical Investigations' in James Der Derian (ed) (1995) *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, p1. Basingstoke: Macmillan; Chris Brown (1997) *Understanding International Relations*, p30. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

5   Peter Wilson, 'The Myth of the "First Great Debate"' in Tim Dunne, Michael Cox and Ken Booth (eds) (1998) *The Eighty Years' Crisis. International Relations 1919–1999*, p6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

6   E.H. Carr (1942) *Conditions of Peace*, p110. London: Macmillan.

7   E.H. Carr (1964) *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, p42. New York: Harper and Row.

8   Ibid., pp73–4.

9   Norman Angell (1911) *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage*, pp115–16, p121, pp217–19. Toronto: McClelland and Goodchild. Norman Angell (1914) *Foundations of International Polity*, pp158–60. Toronto: William Briggs.

10   Hans J. Morgenthau (1965) *Scientific Man vs Power Politics*, pp85–6, 103–4. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

11   Morgenthau's earlier critical-realism was to come closer to Angell's normative approach in later editions of his *Politics Among Nations*, when he began to advocate world government as the solution to war.

12   Hans J. Morgenthau (1985) *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th edn, p52, pp189–90. New York: Knopf; Hans J. Morgenthau [1952] 'The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy', reprinted in G. John Ikenberry (ed) (1989) *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, p642. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman.

13   E.H. Carr (1945) *Nationalism and After*, pp47–74. London: Macmillan.

14   Leonard Woolf (1940) *The War For Peace*, p63. London: Routledge.

15   David Mitrany (1933) *The Progress of International Government*, p16, p172. London: Allen and Unwin.

16   Norman Angell (1940) 'Who Are the Utopians? And Who the Realists?' *Headway* 4 (Jan.).

17   Leonard Woolf, *The War For Peace*, pp127–8 (see note 14).

18   Kenneth N. Waltz (1979) *Theory of International Politics*, ch. 5. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley; Kenneth N. Waltz (1954) *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, ch. 2. New York: Columbia University Press.

19   Leonard Woolf, *The War For Peace*, pp130–8 (see note 14).

20   Norman Angell (1919) *The British Revolution and the American Democracy: An Interpretation of British Labour Programmes*, pp267–8. Toronto: McClelland Goodchild and Stewart.

21   See, for example, Banks, 'Inter-Paradigm Debate', p10 (see note 4); Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories*, pp6–7 (see note 4); Joshua S. Goldstein (1994) *International Relations*, pp47–8. New York: HarperCollins; Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr (1985) *World Politics: The Menu For Choice*, 2nd edn, pp26–7. New York: Freeman. Even in the film version of *The Remains of the Day*, but not in the far more sophisticated book, realist *realpolitik* is associated with the opposition to Nazi Germany.

22   p278 of the 1939 edition of *Twenty Years' Crisis*.

23   p282 of the 1939 edition of *Twenty Years' Crisis*. It is interesting to note that A.J.P. Taylor considered Carr's book to be 'a brilliant argument in favour of appeasement'. A.J.P. Taylor (1964) *The Origins of the Second World War*, p344. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

24   Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p84 (see note 7); Taylor, *Origins of the Second World War*, p173 (see note 23).

25   See, for example, Bernard Johnson's interview with Morgenthau in Kenneth Thompson and Robert J. Myers (eds) (1984) *Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau*, p354. New Brunswick: Transaction; Reinhold Niebuhr (1939) 'Must Democracy Use Force? II. Peace and the Liberal Illusion', *The Nation* (28 Jan.): 117–19.

26   George F. Kennan (1968) 'Report Written October 1940, on "A Year and a Half of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia"' in *From Prague After Munich: Diplomatic Papers 1938–1940*, p239. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

27   Kennan, 'Excerpts From a Personal Letter of December 8, 1938' in: *From Prague After Munich*, p9 (see note 26).

28   Brian Barry (1989) *Theories of Justice*, ch. 10. London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf. See, especially, p364: 'the desire to be able to justify our conduct in an impartial way is an original principle in human nature and one that develops under the normal conditions of human life'.

29   Quintin Hogg (1944) *The Left Was Never Right*. London: Faber and Faber, especially chapters 7–10.

30   A.J.P. Taylor (1969) *The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy 1792–1939*, p154. London: Panther; Michael Howard (1978) *War and the Liberal Conscience*, ch. V. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

31   Quoted in Donald S. Birn (1974) 'The League of Nations Union and Collective Security', *Journal of Contemporary History* 9(3): 131–2.

32   Norman Angell (1931) 'Japan, the League and Us', *Time and Tide* (Nov.): 1302–3; quoted in Edward Alton Risinger Jr (1977) 'Sir Norman Angell: Critic of Appeasement, 1935–40', p10, unpublished doctoral thesis, Ball State University.

33   Quoted in Risinger, 'Sir Norman Angell', p11 (see note 32).

34   Norman Angell (1936) *This Have and Have-Not Business: Political Fantasy and Economic Fact*, pp189–201. London: Hamish Hamilton.

35   See, for example, Norman Angell (1936) 'The New John Bull', *The Political Quarterly* 7(3): 311–29; Norman Angell (1938) *Peace With the Dictators? A Symposium and Some Conclusions*, ch. VIII. London: Hamish Hamilton.

36   Norman Angell (1936) 'Get Effective Defence and You Get the League', *The New Outlook* (10 June): 15–17.

37   H.N. Brailsford, 'A Socialist Foreign Policy' in Addison et al. (1933) *Problems of a Socialist Government*. London: Victor Gollancz.

38   Alfred Zimmern (1945 [1936]) *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law: 1918–1935*, pp425–6, pp452–8. London: Macmillan.

39   Alfred Zimmern (1939) *Spiritual Values and World Affairs*, pp110–11. Oxford: Clarendon.

40   Leonard Woolf (1940) 'Utopia and Reality', *Political Quarterly* 11(2): 167–82.

41   See the discussion in W.E.C. Harrison (1936) (followed by debate) 'The University Teaching of International Affairs', *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 2(3): 431–9, in which it is Toynbee, Zimmern, Laski and Shotwell, all often derided as idealists, who are quoted. Also R.A. MacKay (1941) 'Canada and the Balance of Power', *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 7(2): 229–43, in which ideas associated with both liberal internationalism and realism happily mingle, with no sense of a debate raging within the discipline.

42   Russell, *Theories of International Relations*, ch. 15 (see note 2).

43   Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories*, p84 (see note 4).

44   Frederick L. Schuman (1933) *International Politics*, p682. New York: McGraw-Hill. For continuity in Schuman's pre- and post-war thought see Frederick L. Schuman, 'Regionalism and Spheres of Influence', in Hans J. Morgenthau (1946) *Peace, Security and the United Nations*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

45   Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories*, pp93–4 (see note 4).

46   Robin W. Lovin (1995) *Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

47   Reinhold Niebuhr (1932) *Moral Man, Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics*, ch. 9. New York: Charles Scribner; see also Reinhold Niebuhr (1935) 'The Pathos of Liberalism', *The Nation* (11 Sept.): 303–4.

48   Frederick Sherwood Dunn (1937) *Peaceful Change: A Study of International Procedures*, p14. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

49   Nicholas J. Spykman (1942) *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, ch. 1. New York: Harcourt Brace; Brooks Emeny (1942) *Mainsprings of World Politics*. New York: Foreign Policy Association; W.T.R. Fox (1944) *The Superpowers: The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union – Their Responsibility for Peace*. New York: Harcourt Brace.

50   Maurice Bourquin (ed) (1936) *Collective Security: A Record of the Seventh and Eighth International Studies Conference. Paris 1934–London 1935*, pp458–9. Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation.

51   Russell, *Theories of International Relations*, p541 (see note 2).

52 Social Darwinism remained an influential approach in the study of politics from the late 19th century onwards. One of its most influential supporters was the American historian Brooks Adams, especially his (1943) *The Law of Civilization and Decay: An Essay on History*. New York: Knopf, first printed in 1896.

53 For this view of realism see Salvador de Madariaga (1938) *The World's Design*, p54, pp82–5, p125. London: George Allen and Unwin; and Michael Foot, 'Introduction' in Zilliacus (1944) *The Mirror of the Past*, pp13–14. London: Gollancz.

54 For this view of the genesis of appeasement (although he does not call the appeasers murderers of the League!) see G.M. Gathorne-Hardy (1942) *A Short History of International Affairs: 1920 to 1939*, 3rd edn, pp472–4. London: Oxford University Press.

55 Robert Webber (1994) 'Reconsidering International Relations Theory: The North American and English Schools in the Pre and Early Post-War Era', unpublished paper, Dalhousie University; Wilson, 'Myth of the "First Great Debate"', p7 (see note 5).

56 Niebuhr, *Moral Man, Immoral Society*, ch. 1 (see note 47).

57 Arnold Wolfers, 'The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference' in James N. Rosenau (1969) *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, pp176–8, p179. New York: Free Press.

58 Wilson, 'Myth of the "First Great Debate"', p14 (see note 5).