Integrationstheorien aus vergleichender Perspektive: Best Cases und Test Cases

Das Papier bietet einen kritischen Überblick über den state of the art von Theorien zur Europäischen Integration. ¹ Es diskutiert die Leistungsfähigkeit zehn verschiedener Ansätze der Integrationsforschung im Hinblick auf die bevorzugten Anwendungsbereiche der jeweiligen Ansätze (best cases) einerseits und die Aussagekraft in der Analyse der EU Osterweiterung (test cases) andererseits. Die vergleichende Analyse wird anhand von zehn Beiträgen, die entsprechend der gewählten theoretischen Perspektive nach denselben leitenden Fragen 'ihre' Theorien auf die jeweiligen best cases so wie den vorgegebenen test case anwenden, vorgenommen. Die Auswahl der diskutierten Ansätze beinhaltet Föderalismustheorien, Neofunktionalismus, Intergouvernementalismus, Neoinstitutionalismus, Governance, Netzwerkanalyse, Konstruktivismus, Integration durch Recht, Genderperspektiven sowie Diskursanalysen. Das Papier zeigt, dass Theorien europäischer Integration sich von der Debatte über große Theorien hin zur Entwicklung eines Mosaiks von Ansätzen mit unterschiedlichen analytischen Schwerpunkten und Fähigkeiten herausgebildet haben. An der Empirie gemessen zeigt sich eine durchaus von Fall zu Fall varierende theoretische Leistungsfähigkeit der vorgestellten Ansätze. Es stehen sich hier weniger paradigmatisch exklusiv diskutierte theoretische Alternativen gegenüber als dass sich empirisch orientierte Diskussionen über theoretische Perspektiven eröffnen.

Chapter 1: Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory

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1 The relevance of integration theory

1.1. The dual purpose of this book

There is surely no shortage of books on European integration. This is a booming field, and readers will know better than anyone else the difficulties in choosing the appropriate literature. But it is all the more surprising then that very few of these books are dedicated to the theory of European integration. Most of them deal with the history of the integration process and its main actors, with the European Union’s formal institutions and particular policies, or with present and future member states policies. This is not to say that there is no work done on integration theory. Indeed, this is in many respects a vibrant field that has overcome the impasses of the past. Yet, except for a few notable exceptions that we will return to in the course of this introduction, concise overviews of the field of integration theory remain rare.

This is therefore what we set out to do in this book: first, to provide an introduction to integration theory, its various approaches and how they have developed to those who have started to study European integration, and are interested (as, we argue below, anyone studying European integration should be) in the theories of their field; second, to
provide an overview of the field and take stock of its achievements to date, but also its problems, for those who are involved in the development of European integration theory, and who want to make sense of the sometimes confusing array of approaches that have been proliferating since the 1960s.\(^2\)

To this end, we have invited ten eminent scholars who have contributed significantly to the development of a particular theoretical approach, to take part in this ‘stock-taking’.\(^3\)

We have asked them to reflect upon the development, achievements and problems of ‘their’ approach according to a set pattern, which we will introduce below and which will allow for comparing and relating individual approaches to each other. In this introduction, we want to first make the case for the relevance of theory when studying European integration, which will be our concern in the remainder of this first section. In section two we then proceed to give a broad overview of the phases of theorising European integration, thereby surveying the theoretical approaches that we have included in this volume and providing our rationale for this particular selection. Section three introduces the comparative framework that provided the guide for the chapters. This will include a discussion of the nature of the relationships between theories, a theme that we return to in the conclusion of this book. Finally, building on this discussion, section four introduces the pattern of each chapter and provides an overview of the book.

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\(^2\) Previous versions of this chapter were presented at the 1st Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics in Bordeaux, September 2002, the Biennial Convention of the European Union Studies Association in Nashville, March 2003 and at seminars at Koç, Sabançi and Boğaziçi Universities Istanbul. We are grateful to Knud-Erik Jørgensen, Daniel Wincott, the co-panellists and audiences, and our students in Belfast, Birmingham.

\(^3\) The exception is Andrew Moravcsik, whom we had invited to write the chapter on Liberal Intergovernmentalism. Although in the end he did not do so, he did comment extensively on earlier drafts of Frank Schimmelfennig’s chapter on this approach.
We should add that the process of stocktaking would make no sense if it did not lead to the further development of theory. To that extent, we would not want to see this book read purely to understand and replicate existing theories, but rather as the starting point for criticising and reformulating existing approaches, bringing them together in novel ways and to move beyond them. And we would like to see both colleagues and students involved in this project – it is probably fair to say that without the critical engagement of their students, none of the authors of this book could have made the contribution they did to European integration theory.

1.2. What is integration theory?

In order to talk meaningfully about integration theory, its two constitutive terms ‘integration’ and ‘theory’ need to be defined. This is less straightforward than it may seem at first, since both terms are heavily contested.

Let us turn to integration first. Ernst Haas, one of the most influential neofunctionalist integration theorists (see also Schmitter in chapter 3), once defined integration as the process ‘whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions process or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states’ (Haas 1958: 16). This is a broad definition, which includes both a social process (the shifting of loyalties) and a political process (negotiation and decision-making about the construction of new political institutions above the participating member states with a direct say in at least a part of the member states’ affairs). Not all theorists would include both aspects in their definition, and there are reasons why Haas, from his perspective, emphasised the
social element of integration: As will become clear in chapter 3, functionally defined actors are core promoters of integration in neofunctionalism. A less demanding definition preferred by intergovernmentalists, coming from a different angle within the spectrum of integration theory, focuses instead on political processes, although this may then be qualified as ‘political integration’. While we agree with the societal focus in the neofunctionalist account, we will for the purposes of this book nonetheless adopt the latter, minimalist definition, as we would otherwise exclude some of the more prominent approaches.

While this may seem broad enough as a common denominator for most of traditional integration theory, it is nonetheless too restrictive to account for some of the later developments in what may broadly be seen as the field of integration theory. In both of the definitions above, integration is first and foremost a process: both neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists are more concerned with the process of integration than with the political system that integration leads to. However, more recently various authors have focused specifically on the shape of what they call a new system of governance emerging in the EU. While they are more concerned with the outcome than the process of integration (see Marks et al. 1996a, 1996b), their work is included in our understanding of integration theory, because it now undeniably forms an important part of that field.

Secondly, what is theory? Again, understandings differ, and as above, we endorse a broad rather than a narrow definition. Narrowly defined, theory is understood as a causal argument of universal, transhistorical validity and nomothetic quality, which can be tested through the falsification of a series of hypotheses (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Przeworski and Teune 1982). Some of the chapters discussed in this book will stick to
this narrow definition, many however will not. Instead, they use theory in a rather loose sense of abstract reflection, which despite its abstract nature can nonetheless be context-specific, for instance by taking its point of departure in the consideration of a particular policy field of the EU. To make this point clearer, it helps to consider that theories serve different purposes. Some explain outcomes, behaviour, or decision-making rationales, others criticise general trends on the basis of abstract considerations; some fit particular developments into a larger scheme, others seek to provide normative guidance (see, e.g. Woods 1996). In each case, theory means something else. As we will argue later, different theoretical approaches to European integration are informed by different understandings of the meaning and purpose of theorising.

To distinguish these different understandings from the narrow definition of theory outlined above, we will speak of ‘integration theory’ when we mean the field of theorising the process and outcome of (European) integration, while we use the term ‘theoretical approaches’ when we refer to the individual ways of dealing with integration (see also figure 3.1 in chapter 3), some, but not all of which may be classified as theories in the narrow sense of the term. What they all share, however, is that they are not primarily concerned with the development of particular policies, but with the abstract reflection on European integration.

European integration theory thus is the field of systematic reflection on the process of intensifying political co-operation in Europe and the development of common political institutions, as well as on its outcome. It also includes the theorisation of changing constructions of identities and interests of social actors in the context of this process.
1.3. **Why study integration theory?**

For many, the main purpose of studying integration is to gain a better understanding of the EU’s formal institutions. To do so, students require first and foremost knowledge about how these institutions are set up and how they work so as to identify organisational competences, the role and function of a particular institution according to the Treaties or access points for lobbying activities. From this perspective, the value-added of theory is not immediately obvious – instead, empirical facts appear to provide sufficient information. Why then study integration theory, nonetheless? There are, at least, three reasons.

**First**, theories in the narrow sense of the term help us to explain processes and outcomes of integration, which not only leads to a better understanding of the current set of institutions, but may also help to formulate expectations about future developments and institutional behaviour.

**Second**, apart from the set up, role and function of formal institutions, many readers will, for example, be concerned with questions of democratic reform and legitimacy. On the one hand, these *do* require detailed knowledge about the EU’s institutions. Yet, on the other hand, they also require a deeper understanding of the normative issues at stake, such as: What should legitimacy be based on? Or: What form of democracy is appropriate for a polity beyond the nation-state? Many approaches that do not fit the narrow scientific definition of theory address such issues and assist and encourage further reflections upon them.

**Third**, and arguably more importantly, ‘pure’ empirical knowledge of how institutions work is impossible and thus not very meaningful. It is *impossible* since the representation
of empirical facts is always based on particular concerns, and assumptions about the nature of the EU and the finality of the integration process, which often remain unreflected. Integration theory helps to highlight and problematise these concerns and assumptions. ‘Pure’ empirical knowledge is not very meaningful in the sense that since any empirical representation is imbued with such assumptions, to concentrate on the ‘facts’ provides a superficial understanding only that disregards at least some of the political disputes ‘underneath’ the surface. To sum this point up, analysing integration is not only a ‘technical’ matter, but involves particular understandings and conceptualisations of integration and the EU, for which we need integration theory.

Two examples illustrate this point. The first one concerns the nature of foreign policy decision-making within the EU. To observers who base their assessment on the idiosyncratic organisational design, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is by and large identified as a matter of the Council and therefore intergovernmentally organised. Not quite so, argue some more recent studies (see Jørgensen 1997; Glarbo 2001; Øhrgaard 1997). While it is true that formally, CFSP is primarily a matter between governments and does not fall within the scope of the Commission, this characterisation misses some of the informal, ‘societal’ developments that have created a dense web of consultation with integrative effects, which are not captured by the intergovernmentalist picture. These take place on the ‘social’ level through the creation of a ‘diplomatic community’ within the EU (Glarbo 2001), or the projection of normative power in international politics on the basis of common values and norms (Manners 2002), and they have political consequences, such as the so-called ‘co-ordination reflex’, the wide-spread tendency to co-ordinate foreign policy with other
member states rather than going it alone. The extent to which this is true is a matter of empirical analysis, but the important point is that these studies employ a particular theoretical approach that allows them to bring to the fore the social dimension of the integration process, even in areas formally characterised by intergovernmentalism (see also Risse on social constructivism in chapter 8).

The second example concerns the development of citizenship in the EU. Here, formal institutional approaches would find that Union citizenship was ‘invented’ at the intergovernmental conference that prepared the treaty revisions at Maastricht. As such, it is often seen as a ‘thin’ institution with little substantive importance. Yet, some authors have pointed out that elements of (market-) citizenship, i.e. fundamental rights of working citizens, had been included in the treaties before, and that the way European citizenship emerged at Maastricht was in fact conditioned by previous legal cases, rulings, and provisions (O’Leary 1996, Kostakopoulou 2001, Kadelbach 2002). Others have pointed out that previous “citizenship practice,” i.e. the policies and political processes that forge the institutionalised terms of citizenship within a particular context, had constructed elements of citizenship rights, access and belonging that shaped the formulation of Union citizenship later on (Wiener 1998; see also Meehan 1993). The citizenship case demonstrates that the assessment of an institution’s meaning depends on the type of theoretical approach chosen to study the problem. Whether one regards the institutionalisation of EU citizenship with the Maastricht Treaty as an important development will, for instance, depend on the theoretical assumptions about context, institutional role and function, i.e. whether citizenship is approached from a normative, liberal or, indeed, dogmatic legal perspective. Furthermore, the process of integration
raises questions about theoretical assumptions and contested concepts, for example, the question of whether such citizenship undermines the familiar concept of modern (national) citizenship. All of these are questions that are ultimately of a theoretical nature in the sense of this book, and the theoretical vantage point one takes is crucial for how one answers them.

Reviewing the history of European integration demonstrates that there have been a number of occasions that are hotly debated in the integration literature, mostly due to analysts’ approaching them from different theoretical angles. The following is just a brief selection of controversies, some of which we will get back to in more detail later on:

- **The role of state interests in the founding years**: From a ‘realist’ perspective, integration and especially the developments in the founding years are largely down to interests and power of big member states, during that phase particularly France and Germany, with France wanting to control Germany and Germany having an interest in getting back onto the international stage (see, e.g. Pedersen, 1998). Against this, neofunctionalists have emphasised the role of private and sectorial interests (see *chapter 3*).

- **The lack of major institutional developments in the 1970s**: The 1970s are often labelled the ‘doldrum years’ of integration (and, as it were, integration theory), because political integration seemed to stagnate. But others have argued that ‘below the surface’ a lot of changes took place that would prepare for the ‘reinvigoration’ of integration and integration theory in the latter half of the 1980s.

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4 When we use the term ‘realism’ in this chapter, we refer to realism as a particular tradition in International Relations Theory, rather than as an epistemological position.
(Caporaso and Keeler 1995). Furthermore, outside Political Science, legal scholars have advanced the argument of ‘integration through law’, focusing on increasing legal interdependencies and corresponding shifts in the meaning of sovereignty (see chapter 9).

- The agreement on the Single European Act (1986): The agreement on institutional change introduced with the SEA raised a number of new questions for integration theory. Having been forged at an intergovernmental conference, it led to a re-launch of the theoretical debate discussing the role and formation of state preferences in the negotiations towards the SEA (Moravcsik 1991, 1993, see chapter 4), on the one hand, and emphasising the role of the Commission, informal processes within the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), and the influence of private actors such as the European Round-Table of Industrialists, on the other (Wincott, 1995; Hayes-Renshaw, Lequesne and Mayor Lopez. 1992; Ross 1995; Bornschier 2000).

All of these controversies need to be investigated empirically, but they cannot be reduced to a simple testing of alternative hypothesis, nor can they be addressed purely by ‘thick description’ (Wallace 1996). Instead, seemingly competing theories often shed a different light on the issue that is enabled by a particular theoretical perspective.
2. Integration Theory: A broad overview

2.1. Phases of European integration theory

Having established the relevance of integration theory, we will in the following provide a first overview of its development. This places the theoretical approaches in their historical disciplinary context.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>When?</th>
<th>Main themes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explaining Integration</td>
<td>1960s onwards</td>
<td>How can integration outcomes be explained? Why does European integration take place?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysing Governance</td>
<td>1980s onwards</td>
<td>What kind of political system is the EU? How can the political processes within the EU be described? How does the EU’s regulatory policy work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructing the EU</td>
<td>1990s onwards</td>
<td>How and with which social and political consequences does integration develop? How are integration and governance conceptualised? How should they be?</td>
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Table 1.1: Three phases in integration theory

We suggest that the development of integration theory can be divided into three broad phases (see also Wiener 2002). These are preceded by a normative proto-integration theory period. We identify the three phases as explanatory, analytical and constructive, respectively. A note of caution is on order, however. Since most approaches combine various dimensions of theory, the distinction among the respective phases is not as clear-cut as analytically suggested. The phases are therefore meant to identify the emergence,
development, and, at times, dominance of particular theoretical tendencies, but they are by no means to suggest that these were the only (and sometimes not even the dominant) ones. In Table 1.1, we have left the endpoints of these phases open, since work in one tradition tends to continue after the emergence of new tendencies in theorising. However, when we mention end dates in the following text, these are to signify a shift within European integration theory towards new approaches.

Similarly, although perhaps to a lesser extent, the dates provided for the beginnings of our three phases are also problematic. In 1970, Haas (1970: 635), for instance, had already conceptualised the then European Community as an ‘anarchoid image of a myriad of unity’ with significant ‘asymmetrical overlapping’ and ‘infinitely tiered multiple loyalties’, and Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) analysed the EC as a ‘would-be polity’. Both of these works address issues characteristic of the phase of ‘Analysing Governance’ in European integration theory, as we will further develop below, yet they had been published at least a decade before. We would nonetheless argue that our three phases identify the major tendencies in the development of European integration theory. They are also significant as the general self-image of the discipline, although not everyone would agree with our identification of a third phase in particular.

The normative proto-integration period predates the actual development of political integration in Europe. It is an important pre-cursor of the three phases of integration theory building. Functionalism is typical of this normative period. Popular in the inter-war years, with David Mitrany’s *A Working Peace System* (Mitrany 1943) as the core publication, it had a strong normative agenda, namely how, through a network of transnational organisations on a functional basis, one could constrain states and prevent
future war. This was a global concern and had no direct relation to European integration – as a matter of fact, Mitrany was an opponent of regional integration that he saw as undermining his global concerns and replicating rather than transcending a state-model (Mitrany 1966; see Rosamond 2000: 36-38). Early federalism, too, can be located in this period. As a political movement it was more directly related to particular developments in Europe, for example in the form of calls for a European federation made during the inter-war years by actors as different as the German Social Democrats (see Schneider 1977; Hrbek 1972) and the conservative Hungarian Count Coudenhove-Kalergi (1971).

With the first phase roughly lasting from the signing of the Treaty of Rome until the early 1980s, we enter European integration theory proper. Despite the realist attempts to integrate them into their worldview, the early successes of integration challenged the existence of the territorial state system, which is at the core of realist assumptions. Accordingly, integration theories initially sought to explain the processes of institution-building above the state. Two theoretical approaches came to dominate the debate. Both were based on rational actor assumptions, while locating the push and pull for the integration process on different levels and in different societal realms. Thus, neofunctionalists, in line with their broad definition of integration, explained the move away from the anarchic state system and towards supranational institution-building by depicting particular societal and market patterns as push factors for elite behaviour towards common market building.

Because of the functional interconnectedness of policy areas, these shared policy initiatives in so-called ‘low politics’ areas were seen as having potential for ‘spilling over’ into other policy areas, at first to those closely related to market policy, but
ultimately beyond (*functional spill-over*). In addition to this, to the extent that actors shifted their loyalties and redefined their identities, they were expected to actively demand further integration (*political spill-over*). Neofunctionalists built on functionalism and kept part of its normative agenda (especially ‘political’ neofunctionalists, such as Jean Monnet), yet they also introduced both a stronger emphasis on actors with an interest in, and therefore promoting further integration – primarily the Commission -, and an explicit social scientific interest in creating a general theory of regional integration that was applicable beyond the singular case of Europe (see in particular Ernst Haas’s as well as Philippe Schmitter’s work; Haas 1961, 1967, 1970; Haas and Schmitter 1964; and Schmitter in *chapter 3* of this book). In a different but not dissimilar way, Karl W. Deutsch (1957) saw integration coming about through the increased communication and interaction across borders, which gave his theoretical approach the name ‘transactionalism.’

These arguments were opposed by intergovernmentalists who explained supranational institution-building as the result of rational decision-making within a historical context that was conducive to strong and clearly defined interests of the nation-state governments involved (Hoffmann 1966). The debate between supporters of integration as ‘the rescue of the nation-state’ (Milward 1992), on the one hand, and as the overcoming of the nation-state, on the other, which began in this first phase of integration theory, has remained a consistent factor in social science analysis to this day. While especially more recent additions to this strand of theorising, in particular liberal intergovernmentalism, have not denied the societal impact on supranational institution-building, as the theorisation of societal preference formation in Moravcsik’s work demonstrates (see
Schimmelfennig in *chapter 4*), their focus has been on governmental actors whose capacity for decisions were enhanced by supranational institutions, but not constrained by them. Institutions, according to this view, are designed for particular purposes and under control of the actors who created them. They therefore remain potentially reversible or changeable at any point in time.

For a new generation of integration theorists, however, institutions were not mere tools in the hands of their creators, but had themselves an important impact on both the integration process and the development of European governance. As neoinstitutionalists have demonstrated, institutions can cause ‘unintended consequences’ (North 1990), making the process of institution-building less easily reversible than the intergovernmentalists would have it (Pierson 1996). A particularly dramatic example of unintended consequences was the largely underestimated push to further integration by the Single European Act (Weiler 1999). In terms of European integration theory, as indicated above, this led to the revival and revision of classic integration theories in the form of liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1991) and neo-neofunctionalism (Stone Sweet 2002; Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991). It also marks the starting point for a shift of focus in theoretical approaches to European integration away from International Relations Theory towards Comparative Politics, not least out of a recognition that the EU’s complex institutional set-up seemed to be here to stay. This *second phase* considerably broadened the scope of empirical research and theoretical reflection on European integration, and introduced a greater degree of interdisciplinarity. It brought comparative and institutionalist approaches to the foreground of integration theory, following questions of what kind of polity the EU really is and how it operates -
as Thomas Risse-Kappen (1996) famously put it, to ‘explore the nature of the beast’. Among the concepts developed during this phase to answer these questions are the EU as a system of ‘multi-level’ (Marks et al. 1996a) or ‘network governance’ (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996), or as a ‘multi-perspectival polity’ (Ruggie 1993). Others focused on the way in which policies are made through the analysis of policy networks (Peterson 1995; Peterson and Bomberg 1999). A key process analysed was the “Europeisation” of governance rules, institutions and practices across the EU (Cowles et al. 2001). Questions of institutional adaptation and ‘misfit’ and of ‘good governance’ including legitimacy, democracy and transparency are other issues addressed by works in this second phase of integration theories.

To some extent, the third phase of integration theory is marked by the return of International Relations Theory, although of a different kind. During the 1980s and 1990s, International Relations Theory was characterised by the rise of a variety of critical and constructivist approaches, which drew their inspiration from developments in other fields of social theory. Scholars questioned both the ontological and epistemological assumptions on which traditional approaches had been built. Social constructivists, for instance, demonstrated the relevance of ideas, norms, institutions and identities for international politics and pointed to the interdependence of the structure of the state system, on the one hand, and the agency of those involved in international politics, on the other. Post-structuralists problematised core concepts of International Relations Theory and drew attention to the discursive construction of our understanding of international politics. Critical Theorists and feminists not only developed important critiques of the
contemporary international system, but also often offered alternatives paths towards what they saw as a more just world.

These developments coincided with the move towards political union in the 1991 Maastricht and the 1996 Amsterdam Treaties. Under the pressure of massive enlargement and constitutional revision, integration theory faced the challenge of analysing and problematising the interrelated processes of widening and deepening. Different from the first two phases, which sought to explain or analyse either institution-building on the supranational level, or institutional change on the meso- and sub-state levels, this third phase of integration theory thus faced the more encompassing task of theorising the goal or finality of European integration, the competing ideas and discourses about European governance and the normative implications of particular EU policies. Accordingly, apart from problem-oriented theorising, works during this phase have been concerned with questions about our understanding of integration, how particular policy areas have been defined and developed in the way they did, and what political effects these definitions and historical processes have had.

This third phase therefore focuses on substantial questions about ‘constructing’ (and limiting) European integration. It is in answering these questions that the critical and constructivist approaches in International Relations Theory were taken up, alongside or combined with insights from the ‘constitutional turn’ later in the second phase, which, sparked by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and the increased public debate about

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5 There have of course been critical approaches to European integration all along. See for example, International Political Economy approaches, informed by Marxism and Post-Marxism (e.g. Deppe 1976; Holland 1980), posed themselves as alternatives to the mainstream in the 1970s and 1980s, but they were always confined to a few niches, and did not gain as much popularity as the more recent approaches covered here, although there has over the past decade or so been a resurgence of related approaches in the form of what one could call the ‘Amsterdam School’ (see below).
the legitimacy of European governance, brought normative questions about the EU’s constitution to the heart of the analysis of governance. Especially social constructivism has in some respects drawn on, and in turn contributed to insights in governance approaches. In particular, it has addressed issues of the development of the EU’s formal and informal institutions, as well as processes of Europeanisation, although as far as the latter are concerned, its focus has been on the Europeanisation of identities rather than institutions and policies (see Risse in *chapter 8*).

2.2. *Approaches covered in this book*

The theoretical approaches discussed in this book cover the three phases of integration theory, including their normative pre-cursor. We have therefore divided the book in three corresponding parts, ‘Explaining European integration’, ‘Analysing European governance’, and ‘Constructing the European Union’.

*Part 1, Explaining European integration*, contains firstly a chapter on federalism. While federalism is first and foremost a normative theory, it has been used more recently in a comparative fashion to explain, analyse or device particular features of the Euro-polity (Koslowski 2001). Furthermore, scholars such as Moravcsik (1998) have derived hypotheses about the particular institutional choices made in intergovernmental conferences for European governance from federalism. Together with neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, federalism can be seen as a triad of theories that are often, although problematically so, as we will argue below, presented as competing with each other. Accordingly, *chapter 3* is devoted to neofunctionalism and *chapter 4* to intergovernmentalism, both of which we regard as explanatory approaches.
In *Part II Analysing European Governance*, we turn our focus to those approaches that try to understand and analyse the EU as a type of political system. *Chapter 5* reflects on the development of governance theory, and suggests that this could provide an encompassing framework to address normative, analytical and explanatory questions. Focusing more on the analysis of policy-making processes and drawing on a different set of Political Science literature, *chapter 6* discusses the policy network approach to the analysis of European governance, at the core of which is the explanation of particular policy-decisions with the configuration of the respective policy-field. Finally, *chapter 7* looks at the contribution that various ‘new institutionalisms’ have made to the study of European governance, analysing in particular the impact of institutions on policy-making and the overall development of governance, as well as the shaping of those institutions by political actors. The focus in this chapter is on rationalist and historical institutionalism, whereas sociological institutionalism is discussed as part of social constructivism in chapter 8.

Finally, *Part III Constructing the European Union* deals with those more recent approaches that stress the constructed dimension of European integration and governance and add a critical dimension to studying the European Union. This part includes firstly, a discussion of social constructivist approaches in *chapter 8*. Similar to the development of social constructivism in other social sciences, these approaches come in various forms and with different purposes, but maintain an ambition to understand or explain integration outcomes. *Chapter 9* charts the development of legal approaches in the opposite direction by critically recalling the ‘integration through law’ approach (Capeletti et al. 1986) that sought to explain integrative progression in the EEC based on the ECJ’s
rulings and then opening the scope of integration theory towards legal studies, which, while often overlooked in the theoretical debates of European Studies, have long had a key role in assessing the progress, scope and constructive force of the integration process, and, in line with our three phases, have since the 1980s moved from explanatory to more critical and normative analyses (Shaw and More 1995, Bellamy and Castiglione 1996, Weiler, Haltern and Mayer 1996). Gender perspectives, which are covered in chapter 10, follow a critical and problematising line throughout, building in part on the advances of feminist approaches in other disciplines. Finally, chapter 11 reviews discursive approaches to the analysis of European integration, some of which have used post-structuralist concepts taken mostly from International Relations Theory to problematise particular conceptions of European integration and governance, while others have tried to use those concepts to develop an explanatory framework for the analysis of the European policies of member-states.

The list of approaches covered in this book is obviously not exhaustive of all the approaches available to the student of European integration. We have included what we believe are the currently most salient and influential approaches in European integration theory, and by including some of the more recent developments, we will have already expanded the scope of what is conventionally taught as the core of the discipline. Nonetheless some of the omissions may prove more controversial than others. Three require particular justification.

Firstly, we have not included a chapter on transactionalism. While we agree with those who would like to see this approach given much more attention than it currently receives, because it would refocus our attention to the social, rather than the political integration
process, we cannot ignore that, a few exceptions aside, hardly anyone has followed the lead of Karl Deutsch in this respect. In addition to this, Deutsch’s focus was on NATO and the transatlantic ‘security community’, rather than on European integration per se (but see Deutsch et al. 1967). It is telling that one of the few recent pieces that comes close to transactionalism subsumes Deutsch’s work under neofunctionalism, and focuses on transnational exchange as one of the independent variables influencing the form of supranational organisation, rather than on different forms of community as a result of communication across borders (Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz 1997).

Secondly, we have not included a chapter on Critical Theory, which would have included approaches that build on the work of Jürgen Habermas on legitimacy, discourse and democracy beyond the nation-state, and on the work of critical international political economists such as Robert Cox or Steven Gill, who try to conceptualise the struggles of transnational social forces in a globalising world. Both of these strands of Critical Theory have been used to analyse European integration. Studies that draw on Habermas are gaining influence particularly in interdisciplinary assessments of democratic or good governance (Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Joerges and Neyer 1997, Joerges 2002, Maduro 2002). Members of what may be called the ‘Amsterdam School’ have offered critical analyses of EU economic policies and the impact of economic interests on the integration process, building on the work done by Cox and others in International Relations Theory (Cafruny and Ryner 2003; Ryner et al. 1998; van Apeldoorn 2002). Particularly the latter’s impact on integration theory has so far been relatively limited compared to gender perspectives and discursive approaches, although this may well change in the future.
The relative neglect of Critical Theory, particularly its political economy variety, brings us to a third omission in this book, that of economic theories of integration. In this respect, we do not believe that there can be a purely economic theory of European integration as defined above, which is above all a political and social process. To the extent that economic theories exist in this field, they are looking at particular aspects and especially the effects of economic integration, and are thus not theories of European integration as such (see Balassa 1962, El-Agraa 1982). Economic theories have, however, found their way into some of the approaches covered, such as liberal intergovernmentalism, where predictions about the outcome of domestic bargains over national interests are made on the basis of economic theorems, and they are therefore discussed within these contexts. But we do not think that an economic theory as such is currently playing a major part of the integration theory debates, nor are we convinced that it should be.

Last but not least, the approaches included in this book have in their majority been formulated by scholars working in English, and within the Anglo-Saxon scholarly community. This is a problem to the extent that we are thereby imposing a narrative of the development of European integration theory on scientific communities that may have had a very different experience, and we may have overlooked important and exciting theoretical developments in that process – European integration theory outside the Anglo-Saxon boundaries may indeed be ‘the best kept secret’ (see Jørgensen 2000 for International Relations Theory). Having said that, not all of our approaches have their stronghold in English-speaking universities, as the discussion of national differences below will illustrate. At the same time, the success of approaches beyond national boundaries requires its formulation in what is increasingly becoming the *lingua franca* of
academia. This is not to say that there are no interesting developments outside what is accessible in English. It is also true that there are particular academic styles that differ between national academic communities, and that translating from another language into English does not always properly convey the meaning of the original. But as an overview and a stock-taking exercise, we had to base our selection on what we regarded as success across borders, and English-speaking publications remain in many ways the yardstick for such an exercise, even if this is problematic.

3. Studying integration theory

3.1. Contexts of theoretical development

The story of integration theory can be told from a chronological angle or with a focus on theoretical debates and the specific issues covered. Our account above combined a chronological perspective with a perspective on debates because there are distinct themes and controversies to particular phases of European integration theory. Telling the story of integration theory in these terms is not uncommon (cf. the overviews by Caporaso and Keeler 1995, Bache and George 2001, Rosamond 2000). More contested is the question of how the theoretical approaches relate to each other. There are two aspects to this issue. The first relates to the emergence of theories and the movement from one dominant approach to another, and can therefore be seen as a contribution to the history and sociology of European integration studies. The second is concerned with the ‘fit’ of theories, (e.g. are they compatible or competing?), and is therefore a contribution to theory-building in itself.
Starting with the historical-sociological approach, there are two factors that are often seen as influencing the development of theories, the academic and the socio-political context (cf. Rosamond 2000: 9). The academic context consists of debates and problems that are pursued in the wider scientific context of a particular field as well as the legacies of previous debates in the field itself. Of particular importance in this context are particular ‘paradigms’ that provide researchers with guideposts about how to conduct and present their studies (see Kuhn 1964). The socio-political context, in contrast, consists of factors outside of academia, such as the development of the object under analysis, the influence of sponsors on research agendas, or the discursive restrictions set by a particular political climate. In addition, both of these contexts can be coloured by national differences.

Our account of the three phases of European integration theory above provides plenty of examples for how the study of European integration has followed the ups and downs of its subject. The rise, fall and comeback of neofunctionalism in the 1950s, following the Empty Chair crisis and the Single European Act respectively, is the most obvious one. The relation between the socio-political context and the development of theory is, however, not a one-way street. Thus, not only was neofunctionalism developed on the basis of what happened in Western Europe in the 1950s, neofunctionalism itself also became the quasi-official ideology in the Commission and other parts of the EC institutions. Ironically, as George and Bache (2001: 15) point out, it is today often used by so-called Eurosceptics to increase fears of a technocratic, centralised and undemocratic super-state, whereas governments supportive of further integration tend to resort to the intergovernmentalist rhetoric of sovereignty being only ‘pooled’ in order to alleviate these fears.
While the influence of the EU’s development on integration theory may be obvious, the academic context has been no less forceful in shaping the way in which integration has been conceptualised and analysed. As Rosamond (1995: 394) argues, theoretical approaches to the analysis of European integration ‘have arisen in the context of dominant perspectives in the broad arena of social scientific inquiry’ and are ‘bound up with intellectual fashion and debates between and within different theoretical paradigms’. Thus, if we had included a list of major works in other social sciences and neighbouring fields in this introduction, we would have seen that theoretical movements in European integration studies are often preceded by or run in parallel with developments in disciplines such as International Relations, Political Science or Legal Studies. Neofunctionalism provides yet again a good example with its social-scientific turn against earlier versions of functionalism (see Caporaso and Keeler 1995: 32-4; Kelstrup 1998: 24).

European integration also became an instrument for the pursuit of academic controversies in that it served as ammunition for the critique of the dominant, state-centred realist paradigm (George and Bache 2001: 19). Thereby, the neofunctionalism versus intergovernmentalism debate became embedded in a discourse in which the model of the state remained at the core, either on the national or on the European level (see Rosamond 1995), which in turn hindered the development of a debate about legitimacy ‘beyond the state’ (Kelstrup and Williams 2000: 8). That such a debate eventually became possible is not only due to the acceptance of the EU as a polity discussed above (see Hix 1994: 10), but also to the development of normative, critical and constructivist approaches in other social sciences that could be imported into the third phase of European integration theory.
Similarly, the comparativist project of the second phase benefited greatly from the previous development of neoinstitutionalist research in sociology, which provided comparativists with new concepts to analyse political institutions as an important influence on politics in their own right.

Interestingly, it is the academic context where national differences seem to matter most, rather than the socio-political context, and the problem of language discussed earlier plays a crucial part in this. It is perhaps ironic that most of the classic integration theories have been developed in the United States, rather than within Europe. This, however, can be explained by the dominance of theory-driven American Social Science in International Relations (see Wæver 1998a), from which the approaches in the crucial first phase of integration theory developed. ‘European’ approaches have traditionally tended to be much more historically or normatively oriented, or have been engaged in detailed empirical studies of particular policies (cf. Smith and Ray 1993). Only with the advent of the second and the third phase of integration theory are there more clearly audible European voices – most of them advocating form of social inquiry that is different from the American social science model. Among these voices, there is also a certain degree of differentiation along national or regional lines, although whether this is more than coincidental would require further analysis. To give but two examples, discursive studies of the EU have by and large emerged from a Scandinavian context (e.g. Hansen and Wæver 2002; Larsen 1997; Neumann 1999; Wæver 1998b), whereas two major studies on ideas and European governance have originated in Germany (Jachtenfuchs et al. 1998; Marcussen et al. 2001). Further research would have to be done to substantiate these
initial findings, but they are striking enough to suggest that particular approaches often have a regional ‘centre’.

3.2. Competing or complementary approaches?

The importance of socio-political and academic contexts for the development of integration theory raises fundamental questions about the relationship of individual approaches to each other. Does the discussion in the last section imply that instead of moving to one unified theory, these approaches offer different perspectives that are largely determined by the contexts in which they are developed? Are these perspectives mutually exclusive, and can the arguments they put forward be tested against each other? How, in short, is one to compare the different theoretical approaches?

At the extremes of this debate are, on the one hand, the notion of scientific progress, where through falsification our knowledge of (in this case) integration advances, and, on the other hand, the notion of incommensurable paradigms, which, in effect, construct and talk about different realities, and between which dialogue is hardly possible. If we take the different understandings of theory advanced above, the more scientifically minded will generally tend towards the former, those with a broader understanding of theory towards the latter pole. Consequently, Moravcsik (1998) for instance, in his major contribution to the development of European integration theory, tests different theories against each other in order to establish a (liberal-intergovernmentalist) ground on which future theory can build. His exchange with Diez as well as with Risse and Wiener on the value of this contribution, however, can serve as an example for talking past each other.
because of very different agendas, concepts and definitions that emerge from very
different contexts (see Diez 1999; Moravcsik 1999, 2001; Risse and Wiener 2001).

While we agree that scientific progress is ultimately influenced by its academic and
socio-political context, we nonetheless find the argument of incommensurability
problematic. Most integration theories have been developed within the context of
Western academia, and although their pedigree differs, and consequently their ontological
and epistemological foundations, they share quite a lot of common ground, as will
become more obvious when reading through the chapters of this book. To the extent that
they are incompatible, this is a consequence not of their inherent incommensurability, but
of the claims they make about their scope. In other words, many theorists make broader
claims such as ‘explaining integration’, when what they really do is a much more limited
enterprise, for instance explaining results of intergovernmental conferences, criticising a
particular conceptualisation of integration, or seeking to understand the historical
development of a particular aspect of integration. This problem, as well as the criticism of
it, is not new. Puchala already remarked in 1972 that ‘different schools of researchers
have exalted different parts of the integration “elephant”. They have claimed either that
their parts were in fact whole beasts, or that their parts were the most important ones, the
others being of marginal interest’ (Puchala 1972: 268).

Inappropriate scope claims take an ontological and an epistemological form.
Ontologically, approaches often explicitly or implicitly claim to provide a theoretical
approach to (European) integration as such, while they in fact focus on a particular
process or outcome. If this claim is relaxed, it should be possible to combine different
approaches depending on the subject of analysis. Epistemologically, approaches would
only be incommensurable if they claimed to have the same purpose and if they were
directly related to reality. If, however, we assume that approaches can have different
purposes, and if, perhaps more controversially, we further assume that our understanding
of reality is always mediated by particular discursive contexts, which seems particularly
opportune in the face of the ‘multi-perspectival’ character of the European Union (Ruggie
1993), then it is possible to see different approaches adding to a larger picture without
being combined to a single, grand theory.

Even if two approaches agree on the aim of explaining integration, for instance, they
might still be difficult to compare if what they mean by integration (ontological scope
claim) are two different things. Moravcsik, for instance, focuses on political integration
and the role of intergovernmental bargains, whereas neo-neofunctionalists Stone-Sweet
and Sandholtz (1997) see integration as a much more social process happening in part
through what they call ‘transnational exchange’ between member states societies (see
also Branch and Øhrgaard 1999; on liberal-intergovernmentalism see also Rosamond
1995: 398). All of these are respectable accomplishments in their own right, and hardly
testable against each other (see also Hix 1994: 3). Yet, at the same time, this does not
necessarily make them incommensurable once there is a certain modesty introduced
regarding the scope of the argument made.

The approaches in this book therefore can be seen as providing different perspectives on
the subject of integration, each contributing to our overall understanding of the subject.
They cannot easily be lumped together to form a grand theory of integration because one
needs to adopt their own viewpoint in order to ‘make them work’ (see also Figure 3.1 in
*chapter 3*), and we therefore differ in this respect from the project of developing an over-
arching framework as it was eventually pursued even by Puchala (1972)n and is suggested by Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch in chapter 5. However, they are not always direct competitors either, although some of them will indeed formulate hypotheses that can be tested against each other. Instead, one might see them as stones in an always-incomplete mosaic. The picture of integration that emerges from them is a multi-faceted one – a point we will have to revisit in the conclusion to this volume, together with some of the questions this raises about the advancement and value of theory.

For now, it is important to develop an understanding of the main dimensions along which these approaches differ. We consider two such dimensions as particularly important. One is about the functions of theory shortly referred to above; the other is about the areas (developed below) that the approaches analyse.

3.3. The functions of theory

There are three main functions of theory (broadly understood), and these run parallel to the three main phases of integration theory identified above.

1. Theory as explanation or understanding. Although explaining and understanding approaches differ widely in the epistemological claims they make, and consequently in the methodologies they apply (see Hollis and Smith 1990), they share a common purpose in the sense that they ask why (explaining) or how (understanding) an event has come about. To that extent, they ask for reasons and/or causes for something to happen (on reasons and causes, see the discussion in Wendt 1999 and Smith 2000). The approaches in the first main phase of
integration theory have asked these sorts of questions, and most of them have leaned towards the ‘explanation’ variant. More recent approaches such as Social Constructivism have sometimes also asked similar questions, and while most Social Constructivists would see themselves in the ‘understanding business’, at least some of them have leaned towards ‘explaining’.

2. *Theory as description and analysis*. This might at first seem like a waste-bin category, but it is not. Approaches in this category focus on the development of definitions and concepts with which to grasp particular developments, practices and institutions. In that sense, explaining and understanding approaches have to presuppose descriptive and analytical approaches because the latter provide the former with the concepts on the basis of which events can be explained or understood. In the second main phase of integration theory, we would expect a focus on description and analysis because one of the aims of these approaches was to provide a vocabulary with which to capture ‘the nature of the beast’.

3. *Theory as critique and normative intervention*. While approaches in the first two categories take the development of integration more or less as a given, other approaches question the route that the integration process, or a particular policy, has taken, or develop norms and principles for the future of integration. Approaches in this category therefore either problematise a given development, or they develop alternatives. Theory in this understanding is often much closer to what one might call philosophy, or perhaps only ‘abstract reflection’, but in the form of normative theory, it has always had its rightful place in the canon of Political Theory, and many critical theories have recently been added to this. At
least some of the approaches included in our third phase of integration theory fall into this category.

If theory has such different purposes, it would be unfair and not even valid to hold one approach accountable on the basis of criteria set by another one. Evaluating and weighing theoretical approaches against each other therefore always has to take account of the principal function or purpose that the approach assigns to itself, unless we want to impose one common purpose on all theoretical approaches.

3.4. The areas of theory

It is, however, not only the purpose of theory that varies, but also the area, or the ‘object’ of particular approaches. Analysing member states’ integration policy is different from, although related to, reflecting on the best institutional set-up for the EU, and consequently may require a different methodology. These areas of theory are a second, independent dimension on which theoretical approaches can differ from each other. Again, we propose three different areas, which we have delineated along the triad of polity, policy and politics.

1. Theory dealing with polity. ‘Polity’ refers to the political community and its institutions. Approaches falling into this category would be those analysing the ‘nature of the beast’, those explaining how the EU’s institutional structure came about or those trying to find constitutional alternatives on the basis of normative considerations, to give examples taken from all three functions of theory.
2. **Theory dealing with policy.** ‘Policy’ includes the actual measures taken to tackle concrete problems, and theoretical approaches in this area analyse and compare their content, or critically reflect upon them. This includes aspects such as ‘policy style, the general problem-solving approach, the policy instruments used, and the policy standards set’ (Börzel and Risse 2000: 3). However, to qualify as theory according to our definition above, such analyses need to be brought onto an abstract level, for instance by drawing out general patterns of policy content, or reflecting on the normative underpinnings within a policy field.

3. **Theory dealing with politics.** ‘Politics’ comprises the process of policy-making and the daily struggles and techniques of political actors dealing with each other. It is about the bargaining between governments, the influence of particular interest groups, or the dominance of a specific style of how decisions are reached. Approaches concerned with politics look at such issues as why technocratic governance prevails over participatory governance, how interest groups try to influence the policy-making process, or how particular groups are systematically disadvantaged by the dominant political style.

As these definitions have illustrated, it would empirically be rather difficult to strictly stick to one of these areas. Any discussion of polity is likely to involve constitutional frames in which policy-making takes place, or which restrict the content of policy, as well as the implication of constitutional arrangements for politics. Nonetheless, approaches are likely to emphasise one or the other, and not deal with all three poles of the triad in equal measure. Moreover, to the extent that they want to explain, they will use polity, policy and politics either as the *explanandum* (what is to be explained) or the...
explanans (the explaining factor). However, a theoretical approach such as neofunctionalism might aim at explaining integration outcomes (here polity), while focusing on their explanation (here politics). Therefore, one has to specify how the areas of theory figure within each approach. Furthermore, to say that an approach ‘deals with polity’, does not necessarily mean that the other two areas are excluded all other considerations, but that they are of less importance within the works of this approach.

3.5. The mosaic of integration theory

Combining these two dimensions, we arrive at what we call the ‘mosaic of integration theory’. Keeping the caveats raised above in mind, theoretical approaches can be located in the nine cells of this table. Its ‘mosaic-ness’ comes from the fact that each approach can be seen as a stone that adds to the picture that we gain of the EU. This picture is likely to remain unfinished, as new approaches will add new stones to change the picture. To reiterate, our point is that rather than directly competing with each other, each approach contributes to the emerging picture in its own limited way. The contributions can be ambiguous – the EU itself in many ways is. But they are not necessarily mutually exclusive and incommensurable, as is often assumed. Placing an approach in a particular part of the mosaic therefore clarifies with which approaches it actually competes in a rather narrow field.

Even if this is the case, however, the two approaches may still not be directly testable against each other. The example of liberal-intergovernmentalism v. neo-neofunctionalism illustrates this. In this case, while both approaches want to explain the political process of reaching a decision, and to some extent the outcome of that process in terms of its effects
on the polity, they actually look at different political processes due their different definitions of integration. The distinction of various analytical areas is therefore a rather general one that always needs to be supplemented by a closer look at the basic concepts and definitions that approaches use within their area. This is not only true for the area- but also for the function-dimension. Because we have lumped together ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’, ‘analytical’ and ‘descriptive’, ‘critical’ and ‘normative’, approaches even within one cell are not necessarily directly comparable, as the epistemological claims they make differ widely, and thus the scope of their argument.

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Table 1.1: The functions and areas of (integration) theory

As we have pointed out above, approaches will usually find themselves in more than one category. The mosaic should not be seen as an exercise in compartmentalisation. Instead, it is a heuristic device that allows us to move beyond fruitless debates in which approaches operating in different areas and pursuing different purposes talk past each other. Besides, even though approaches will cross the imaginary boundaries of the identified fields, they will tend to focus on one or the other – life is too short, and book space too restricted to deal with everything.
4. Reviewing integration theory

4.1. The structure of the chapters

Although the structure of individual chapters varies, they all address a set of questions that will help in the comparison between theoretical approaches and the assessment of their compatibility or incommensurability. Each author was asked to summarise the origins of the approach covered, its main arguments and development over time. As the authors were substantially involved in the development of ‘their’ approach, these sections are to be seen not only as an introduction, but also as a reflection on the current state-of-the art of each approach in relation to earlier work. Chapters also include an overview of the main debates surrounding approaches, including the criticism raised from the perspective of other approaches, the main current questions facing authors and potential ways forwards.

However, in order to answer our main questions regarding the comparison of the approaches, we have asked authors to include a section in which they provide an example of a concrete puzzle that they think ‘their’ approach is particularly apt to address, and which in the past has been a focus of many works written in this tradition. If our argument about European integration theory as a mosaic holds, we expect approaches to differ in their ‘best case’, or in the area that they focus upon. We have furthermore asked authors to include a section in which they summarise, or speculate, how works written from ‘their’ approach have, or would address the issue of enlargement as a ‘test case’.
Again, we expect the contributions to focus on different areas of, but also to ask different types of questions about enlargement, illustrating the different functions of theory.

On the basis of these two sections where authors provide examples of how ‘their’ approaches deal with concrete issues, we will return in the conclusion to the questions raised in this introduction, but we also invite readers to make their own comparisons when reading this book, and to use these sections as a starting point for critical reflections on the past or ongoing debates summarised in each chapter, and thereby pushing European integration theory forward.

4.2. Past, present and future

‘Past, present and future’ is the subtitle of this book. It provides an organising theme in a double sense. Firstly, each chapter, by reflecting on the origins and development of each approach, on the main puzzles addressed and state-of-the-art, and on the current challenges and ways forward, addresses the past, present and future of each approach. Secondly, the three parts of this volume reflecting the three phases of European integration theory can be seen as an expression of ‘past, present and future’: ‘Past’ in the sense of a set of approaches that have been with us since the early days of integration theory, have been developed to a considerable degree, and have influenced subsequent generations of integration scholars; ‘present’ in the sense that a lot of theoretical work today has shifted towards questions of governance that combine International Relations and Comparative Politics; and ‘future’ in the sense that a set of novel approaches raise a number of issues which, although unlikely to dominate theoretical development in the
future, will have to be taken into account, as they are now taken into account in other Social Sciences.

We have already made clear that we do not wish to reinforce some of the fault(y) lines along which the field of European integration theory was divided in the past. Instead, we see in the present a healthy trend towards a proliferation of approaches that contribute to an ever more faceted and nuanced picture of the European Union, its history and its development. What we would like to see in the future is neither the development of one single grand theory, nor the isolation and non-communication between approaches. The following chapters should help to clarify where each approach comes from, and what the scope of its argument is, so that a critical but constructive and open debate can thrive.

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Chapter 12: Taking Stock of Integration Theory

Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez


1 Introduction

This volume sought to achieve two goals. First, it was compiled to assess the state of the art in European integration theorising. To that end, we brought together a group of scholars who are able to present and reflect upon the core theoretical contributions that have been developed since the early stages of analysing European integration and governance. The second goal of the book was the generation of a critical discussion about the object and process of theorising European integration as such. To that end, the choice of contributions reflects the variation in disciplinary context, historical stage of theorising and the comparative dimension of approaches. This analytical dimension of the book is sustained by the ‘best’ and ‘test’ case scenarios, which have been included in each chapter to test the robustness of each approach.

This concluding chapter brings the past-present-future theme running through the book as well as through each contribution, to a close. In the remaining sections we offer first a historical overview over the type and focus of each theoretical approach to European integration developed by the contributors (‘past’); second, we develop a comparative assessment of the respective strengths and weaknesses of each approach according to the definitions of ‘theorising’ and ‘integration’ developed in the introductory chapter
(‘present’); and third, we elaborate on the emergent and most challenging issues that stand to be addressed by forthcoming adaptations and scrutinizations of European integration theories (‘future’).

We argue that the different theoretical perspectives developed in the ten contributions to this volume demonstrate an emerging robustness of European integration theories. The variation in approaching the respective ‘test case’ of European enlargement reveals the need for both rigorously prescriptive and normative approaches to European integration. As the social constructivist, the critical legal approach, the gender perspectives and the discursive approaches presented in chapters 8-11 demonstrate in particular, core constitutional issues that determine the quality of emergent transnational political orders (March and Olsen 1998; Olsen 2002) such as values and norms, identity, and equality have been receiving relatively less analytical attention than approaches that seek to explain institutional and regulatory processes. Yet, the two-tiered development of massive enlargement and constitutional revision which the process of European integration has come to face in post cold-war times require a more robust theoretical and analytical understanding of the interplay between process and substance. While a decade ago the constitutional topic “spelt political death,” mostly for evoking the ‘f-word’, i.e. a federal statist quality of the Europolity, current activities resemble a “political and intellectual stampede to embrace the idea of a constitution for Europe” (Weiler 2002, 563). The "constitution is no longer a taboo" in integration discourse (Pernice 2001, 3-4) and the constitutionalization of the Treaties has become an accepted policy objective.\footnote{See, for example, European Parliament, Committee of Institutional Affairs (2000) Report on the Constitutionalisation of the Treaties, Final A5-0289/2000’, PE 286.949.} It
is an expression of the constitutional turn in the Europolity. That is, supranational – European – integration has evolved from the pre-integration time of cooperation under anarchy and a long period of cooperation towards integration, then a new shared goal of cooperation, and eventually constitution building.

With this constitutional turn, the process of constitutionalising the Europolity\textsuperscript{7} enters into a qualitatively different phase. After supranational institution building until the 1980s and the Europeanization of domestic institutions until the late 1990s, currently a process of \textit{late politicization} evolves (Wiener 2003). Indeed, we argue that the constitutional turn that reflects both the historical process as well as the extensive scholarly literature since the 1990s, remains to a large extent under-theorised. The outcome and durability of this new quality of inter-national cooperation therefore remains to be assessed.\textsuperscript{8} The pressure of constitution-building raises the stakes of transnational politics - it may well turn into the make or break of the project of European integration. The following sections will first offer a comparative assessment of the different approaches to European integration presented in this volume (section 2) and then map core issues and relevant research questions which European integration theories stand to elaborate more extensively in the future (section 3).

\textsuperscript{7} As Dieter Grimm notes “[W]hen a constitution for Europe is talked about today, what is meant is a basic legal order for the polity of the sort that arose at the end of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century in the wake of two successful revolutions in America and in France ...” (Grimm 1995: 284). For the discussion of the term see an overview with Schepel 2000, and extensive discussion with Craig 2001.

\textsuperscript{8} However, the European constitutional debate is characterised by the absence of a shared constitutionalist approach. As Armin von Bogdandy notes “[T]he divergence in approach and even the lack in systematic approaches to European Union law render an assessment of key approaches, main directions, and plausible decisions in the constitutional debate, an enormously complex exercise.” (Bogdandy, 2000: 209) Indeed, to some it appears "astonishing that so many scholars and politicians speak about the future constitution of Europe." (Zuleeg, 2001: 1)
2 Comparative Perspective

In the introduction, we suggested to compare the theoretical approaches to the analysis of European integration included in this volume along two dimensions, their purpose or function, and the specific area of integration they study. We also argued that the different approaches together would form a mosaic providing a multi-faceted and never complete picture of European integration and governance. To demonstrate this, we asked contributors to present a case that they thought ‘their’ approach is addressing particularly well (‘best case’), as well as to apply ‘their’ approach to the ‘test case’ of enlargement. Our expectation was that contributors would select different aspects of European integration and governance as their ‘best case’, which they would analyse for different purposes. Furthermore, we expected that they would approach the analysis of EU enlargement from different angles, depending on the main purpose of ‘their’ approach, and consequently focusing on different aspects or areas of enlargement. If this was the case, the various approaches would neither be directly comparable or testable against each other, nor would they be incompatible. Instead, they could be seen as each shedding a different light on European integration and governance, and therefore adding another stone to the mosaic of integration theory.

Overall, the chapters in this volume have met our expectations, as the overview provided by Table 12.1 demonstrates. With a few exceptions, their ‘best cases’ differ widely, and where they overlap, such as in liberal intergovernmentalism’s and neofunctionalism’s attempt to explain outcomes of integration, they focus on different aspects of the integration process, which are not mutually exclusive, even though their relative
importance can empirically be tested. Similarly, the ten approaches selected have very different things to say about enlargement, focussing on the explanation of enlargement, an analysis of the demands of enlargement on EU institutions, or a critical assessment of the effects of enlargement on the societies within the new member states – or admitting that they have little to contribute to this discussion, making such approaches appropriate for the analysis of deepening integration, but not of widening the territorial scope of membership.

Table 12.1: Comparative Perspective

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<th>Author</th>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>‘best case’</th>
<th>‘test case’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(enlargement)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Burgess</td>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>Normative: constitutional</td>
<td>Normative: maintaining acquis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>evolution</td>
<td>communautaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Schmitter</td>
<td>Neo-functionalism</td>
<td>Explaining integration outcomes (in cycles)</td>
<td>Predicting effects of enlargement on spillover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Schimmelfennig</td>
<td>Intergovernmentalism</td>
<td>Explaining the consolidation of the Single Market</td>
<td>Explaining outcomes of bargaining in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Key Points</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch</td>
<td>System Governance</td>
<td>Describing, explaining, assessing interplay of governance and polity</td>
<td>Predicting effects of increased heterogeneity on governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Peterson</td>
<td>Network Governance</td>
<td>Explaining policy outcomes in CAP</td>
<td>Predicting effects of enlargement on policy networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Pollack</td>
<td>Neo-institutionalism</td>
<td>Explaining executive, judicial and legislative politics</td>
<td>Explaining decision to enlarge, outcome of negotiations and effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Risse</td>
<td>Social Constructivism</td>
<td>Understanding the construction of Euro-pan/national identity</td>
<td>Explaining the EU’s decision to enlarge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Haltern</td>
<td>Integration through law</td>
<td>Critical assessment of European citizenship</td>
<td>Critical assessment of effects on European law and the nature of the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Waever</td>
<td>Discursive Approaches</td>
<td>Explaining / critically assessing</td>
<td>Critically assessing enlargement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Taking this ‘test case’ as an example, the mosaic that emerges of enlargement is one that focuses firstly on the decision of the European Union to enlarge (Pollack, Risse, Wæver), proposing that norms and previous commitments were decisive in this respect. Generally, the decision to apply for EU membership by the candidate countries is seen as less problematic – the puzzle in the case of the EU is that rationalist explanations are ultimately not convincing. However, this does not mean that the membership candidacies are uncontested, or that there would not be important bargaining processes between the EU and its current member states and the candidate countries, explaining the outcome of which is at the core of the liberal intergovernmentalist agenda (Schimmelfennig). Given the focus on explanation in their ‘best cases’ (see below), surprisingly many contributors were concerned with the effect of enlargement. They predict, perhaps less surprisingly, that European governance and further integration will become more complicated: spill-over may be hindered (Schmitter); increased heterogeneity may lead to ‘increasing regulatory competition and informality’ (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch) as well as further differentiation of the *acquis communautaire* (Haltern); inexperienced civil
servants may make decision-making more difficult, while reform of governance will be less likely due to the increased number of member states (Peterson); and path-dependency may dictate continued variation and therefore increased administrative complexity, while Europeanisation may decrease this problem but only in the long run (Pollack). Given these complications, a federalist is, from a normative point of view, alarmed, and insists that the *acquis* cannot be jeopardised (Burgess). Finally, discourse analysis and gender studies add critical voices as to the terms on which enlargement proceeds (Wæver) and the effect it has on the women in the societies of the new member states (Hoskyns).

It should be obvious that such an account is incomplete in a double sense. Firstly, it is a reflection of the most pressing questions that have been raised for European integration theory so far, but there will surely be others. It seems, for instance, quite likely that once the new member states have joined, competing explanations of the outcome of the negotiation processes can be put forward and assessed, and more specific questions about both domestic and EU-institutional effects of enlargement may be asked. Secondly, both the angle provided on enlargement by each author, as well as the selected ‘best case’ and how to approach it, do not necessarily cover all the work done from within one particular approach. Gender perspectives are presented in this volume, for instance, with a focus on the early days of gender analysis in the context of European integration. Thus, the phase of ‘generating material’ (Hoskyns) remains very often at a more descriptive level, e.g. stressing the observation of the widening scope of gender equality law within the EU, and
the effects of integration on women more generally (see e.g. Hoskyns 1996). With this caveat in mind, Table 12.2 represents an attempt to approximate what might be most appropriately described as a ‘mosaic of European integration theory’ by filling in the boxes of Table 1.1 (see Chapter 1). As a note of caution, this table is not intended to represent such a mosaic in itself, nor do we intend to offer a definitive answer to the question of how theoretical approaches relate to each other. According to the hermeneutic approach of this volume, we do, however, suggest that a debate about where one would preferably place each approach contributes to a better understanding both from the perspective of the editors and that of the readers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPLANATORY/ UNDERSTANDING</th>
<th>POLITY</th>
<th>POLICY</th>
<th>POLITICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXPLANATORY/ UNDERSTANDING</td>
<td>Neo-functionalism; Intergovernmentalism; Integration Through Law</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Neoinstitutionalism; Social Constructivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Network Analysis; Discourse Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANALYTICAL/ DESCRIPTIVE</td>
<td>Gender Perspectives</td>
<td>Gender Perspectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRITICAL/ NORMATIVE</td>
<td>Federalism (Critical) Integration Through Law</td>
<td>Discourse Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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9 But see, for example, more analytical gender analysis by Elman 1996; Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000; Liebert 1999; 2002; Locher 2002; Wobbe 2003 and Marx Ferree (forthcoming).
Three features of the above table immediately catch the eye and need to be addressed. The first and probably least problematic one is that both Integration through Law and Discourse Analysis appear twice, whereas the Governance Approach does not appear at all. The reason for the former appearing twice is that in both chapters, there is a clear differentiation between different strands that result in more radically different variations than in the case of, for example, neo-institutionalism. Within the Integration Through Law chapter, we find the development from law as an explanatory factor of further integration towards law as a normative or critical reflection on current developments of the Europolity (as well as specific policies). Among the discursive approaches, there is a similar split between those trying to explain member states’ policies towards integration and those problematising the assumptions on which integration policies are based, although in practice both enterprises often go hand in hand. Governance approaches, in contrast, are not mentioned at all in the table. This omission is due to the fact that in their chapter, Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch make a self-conscious attempt to bridge the different purposes as well as the different areas of theory, and therefore develop governance as a grand theory within which all other approaches can find their place. In a sense, this constitutes an alternative path of seeing the relationships between theoretical approaches to the one put forward by the editors. While Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch propose a catch-all theory of overarching character, we argue that it is better to see integration theory as a mosaic in which different perspectives come together in their own right. Ultimately, the problem with the grand theory route, as we see it, is that it has to
impose particular ontological and epistemological assumptions on the analytical possibilities included within the framework of the theory. Those closer to a narrow scientific understanding of theory may see this as a good thing, but it does not conform with the spirit of theoretical diversity, and doing justice to the purposes and areas of theory as set out in chapter 1.

The second and perhaps most obvious characteristic of Table 12.2 is – except for gender perspectives - the absence of entries in the ‘analytical/descriptive’ row. In chapter 1, we proposed that it was one of the functions of theory to provide new conceptualisations of particular social and political phenomena, and that this was particularly important in relation to the EU as a new kind of polity. We further argued that European integration theory evolved in phases, starting, after a period of normative pre-theorizing, with an explanatory phase, which was then followed by an analytical phase as the EU was taken more seriously as a polity of its own right in the 1980s, and then by a renewed interest in normative questions, and, following the epistemological debates in the wider social sciences, in problematising European integration and governance and particular policies.

A revised model of the three phases of theorising would locate the approaches within the historical context of integration. From a hermeneutic standpoint, it is interesting to observe how these phases reflect distinct theoretical foci in relation to the relevance and place of institutions in theory and practice. Thus European integration theory develops gradually including the three phases of integration (explaining integration as supranational institution-building, Part I of this book), Europeanization (analyzing
governance, Part II of this book), and politicization (constructing the polity, Part III of this book). Table 12.3 summarizes the three phases and their respective focus on institution-building.

Table 12.3: Three Phases of Theorising European Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Dynamic</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Normative pre-</em></td>
<td>World politics</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>theorising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1985</td>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>Supranational Level</td>
<td>bottom-up</td>
<td>Hard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(more/less)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 -</td>
<td><em>Europeanisation</em></td>
<td>Domestic, regional level in member and candidate countries</td>
<td>top-down</td>
<td>Hard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(more/less)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 -</td>
<td><em>Politicisation</em></td>
<td>Euro-polity</td>
<td>trickle-across, bottom-up, top-down</td>
<td>hard/soft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(more/less)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

As this book’s contributions demonstrate, the first two phases are well developed sets of theoretical approaches. The third phase has just begun to shed light on substantial constitutional questions such as the legal status of the EU, the constitutional status of the
Charta of Rights, the role of the church, and the application of Qualified Majority Voting in high politics such as Common Foreign and Security Policy.\textsuperscript{10} These issues lead beyond the erstwhile considerably radical challenges of political relations beyond nation-state boundaries, presented by the practice of pooling sovereignty as well as by the legal principles of supremacy and direct effect – and their potentially unintended consequences that have sunk in with social scientists only gradually (Craig and De Burca 1998; see also Haltern in this volume).

A closer look at the governance approach, the policy network approach and neo-institutionalism in Part 2 – Analysing Governance demonstrates that they do take integration and the EU as a new kind of polity as a given, and therefore shift the emphasis from explaining or advocating integration to questions about how governance within this new polity works. Yet, it also emerges from these chapters that none of these approaches is content with the provision of new conceptualisations of governance alone, although this was an important contribution to the debate. Instead, they strive to explain specific phenomena within this system of governance, such as particular policies or particular aspects of its politics. While they are, in this sense, analysing governance rather than explaining integration as such, they are moving beyond the analysis of governance in the sense of a purpose of theory as set out in chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{10} See the draft text of the Treaty that is to establish a “Constitution” of the EU, and which was adopted by members of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Brussels, 13 June 2003. For the text see: Draft Convention Volume I including Part I and Part II (CONV 797/1/03) and Volume II including Parts III, IV, and V (CONV 805/03).
As Table 12.2 highlights, the predominant purpose of theoretical approaches within European integration theory is to explain or understand either the process of integration and its outcomes, or particular aspects of European integration and governance. Even an approach such as discourse analysis, the roots of which can be traced to post-structuralism, is used at least by some in European integration theory to understand member states policies towards integration, and although its usage of the term explanation is different from the usage, say, in liberal intergovernmentalism, the purpose is sufficiently similar to the latter’s – indeed, Wæver (1998: 103-4) in his own work explicitly sets out to bridge the gap between critique and explanation. This heavy bias towards explanation may be seen as one symptom of the tendency to make claims beyond the scope of one’s theory, which we have identified as problematic in our introduction. Be this as it may, the emphasis on the explanation of particular integration policies and outcomes in terms of polity has until recently led to a relative neglect of addressing the issue of politicisation, both in the form of attempts to analyse the increasing politicisation of integration and governance among societies, and in the form of contributing to a critical debate about the desired shape of the EU.

3 Outlook: Towards the Politicization of European Integration

How do integration theories fare fifty years on? What is the state of the discipline which has now developed an impressive corpus of texts, produced a stable research context based on international learned associations, and has, last not least, generated a widely acknowledged teaching profile? The discipline now encompasses a broad spectrum of theoretical approaches ranging from the period of normative pre-integration theorising
that emerged largely from US-American IR theory (see, most prominently, Mitrany’s as well as Deutsch’s work) via grand theory debates (Hoffmann; Haas; Schmitter; Deutsch; Lindberg and Scheingold) to a much more refined set of approaches in the early 21st century. This volume presents a selection of its core approaches. The overview of the past, present and future of theorising about European integration suggests that as an increasingly independent sub-field in the social sciences, integration theory has come full circle and been able to move towards the proverbial higher plane. The following elaborates on this observation.

Given that in the early days of integration theory normative issues of integration were discussed within the framework of international relations theory, bringing in interest-oriented and institutional approaches to world politics, it appears that in the light of today’s clearly discernable and distinguished, albeit interdisciplinary European studies discipline, theoretical approaches to integration have come full circle. More specifically, the normative dimension of European integration is back on the table. However, the focus has changed. While in the 1950s the theoretical emphasis on explaining regional integration and supranational institution building was put on the necessity and probability of enduring institutions in the international system of sovereign states with a view to constructing a civilised Kantian world community, today’s normative approach is focused on the issue of democratic legitimacy (or the lack of it) under conditions of supranational constitutional integration. This shift from the former normative perspective on world politics that built on the idealist Grotian tradition in IR, to conditions of democratic governance in regionally integrated political orders, is embedded in a broad
change in IR theories regarding the acceptance of institutions in world politics. Thus, institutional approaches developed both inside and outside European integration theories have contributed to a widely accepted role of – hard – institutions such as international organizations, treaties, conventions and written agreements in world politics (March and Olson 1989, 1998; Hall and Taylor 1996; Ruggie 1998; Onuf 2002). In particular, the various neo-institutionalisms have been able to sustain the role of institutions in world politics as enhancing cooperation among states, monitoring policy implementation, facilitating information and safe-guarding norms (Keohane 1988; Garrett 1992; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Pollack 1996; see also Pollack and Risse in this volume).

With its explicit focus on finality, community and constitutionalised polity, the dual process of enlargement and constitution building, presents a challenge to the majority of integration theories that focus on interests and institutions. The limit of such an exclusive focus compared with approaches that allow for a broader perspective on polity formation, governance and constitutional principles is thus brought to the fore. This challenge is well presented by the choice of ‘best’ and ‘test cases’ brought to the fore by the contributors of this volume, and the fact that far more contributors chose to focus on the effects of enlargement than on its explanation, while explanation dominated in the selection of ‘best cases’. Surely, interests and institutions play a key role in explaining enlargement. The pressure for institutional change which has been created by the massive enlargement process launched in Copenhagen 1993, affects member states, candidate countries as well as the Europolity itself. Problematising both institutional change and adaptation on the one hand, as well as the interests in enlargement, on the other, can therefore be
characterised as organic research objectives. Logically, they build on a long-standing tradition of explaining institution-building on the supranational level as well as institutional adaptation, or, Europeanization in the respective domestic member state contexts. Yet, different from previous enlargement rounds, this time constitutional reform has developed a much stronger momentum than previous Treaty revisions at intergovernmental conferences (Christiansen and Joergensen 1999; Moravscik and Nicolaides 1999; Falkner and Nentwich 2000; Wiener and Neunreither 2000; De Burca and Scott 2002; Beaumont, Lyons and Walker 2002; Bogdandy 2003; Weiler and Wind 2003).

Constitutional politics has therefore turned into a core political issue in the EU. More specifically, in distinction from states that cooperate under anarchy in world politics, on the one hand, and EU member states that have been cooperating towards integration, on the other (Wiener 2002), the current EU member states and, albeit to a limited extent, candidate countries have been cooperating towards a shared constitutional agreement. The constitutional turn has generated a new importance of constitutional norms, principles and routinised practices. These so-called soft institutions have been addressed by a large and growing literature on constructivism in IR, that studied the influence of world views, principled beliefs, routinised practices and norms to the fore (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994; Ruggie 1998; Risse-Kappen 1996; Sikkink 1993; Katzenstein 1993, 1996). In European integration studies, the constructivist focus on soft institutions has offered a new interdisciplinary perspective on
European integration as a process that involves the constitutionalization of shared European norms, principles and procedures including both law and the social sciences.

In sum, the constitutional turn in the 1990s raises deeper questions about the constitutive role of social practices and the (social) legitimacy in supranational politics more generally. The EU is not a state yet evolves around and works on the basis of core constitutional norms, principles and procedures akin to the central constitutional reference frame of national states such as the rule of law, fundamental and citizenship rights and the principle of democracy (Article 6, TEU) and some thus endorse the concept of European constitutional law. These fundamental – constitutional – principles have evolved over time in interrelation with the fundamental constitutional principles and practices of the respective EU member states. Their substance carries meaning created through a process from which candidate countries are by definition excluded. The routinised practices, procedures and norms that have been constitutive for the constitutionalization of these fundamental principles therefore remain a foreign discourse with little meaning for candidate countries. Politically speaking, different understandings generate issues of conflict. As a research theme, conflictive developments that are brought to the fore by the double process of enlargement and constitutional revision, raise different types of research questions, pending on the perspective, goal and

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11 The existence of European constitutional law is usually derived from the constitutionalization of the Treaties going back to the process of “integration through law”, see also chapter 9 in this volume; for a few contributions to the burgeoning literature on the subject, see e.g. Pernice, 1999; Bogdandy, 1999; Weiler, 1999; Craig, 2000; Walker, 2002; Beaumont, Lynn and Walker, 2002; Bogdandy, 2003; Stone Sweet 2002.

12 This interrelation between European and member state constitutional norms, values and understandings is well encapsulated by the concept of “multilevel constitutionalism” developed by Ingolf Pernice; see for details, Pernice, 1999: 707-9.

13 In the legal literature the term ‘constitutionalization’ is applied with reference to the growing body of legal rules and procedures included in constitutional documents (Craig 2001, Schepel 2000).
context from which the issue is assessed. Thus, for example, from a prescriptive analytical standpoint certain institutional conditions are necessary (types of constitution; political order; types of democracy; etc.). In turn, a normative analytical standpoint would focus on the question of whether it is possible, and if it is, how to establish particular constitutional principles to keep such a diverse polity with its different understandings together.

4 Conclusion

This volume’s contributions have demonstrated that theorising European integration involves at least **three main factors**. They include the choice of the **research object** (polity: supranational institution-building; policy: specific EU policies or member states’ policies towards integration; politics: quality of integration), the analytical **research purpose** (explanatory/understanding, descriptive/analytical; normative/critical), and the **context** in which the research project has been designed (historical and disciplinary perspective). The choice of research object and purpose does matter. It generates a distinct theoretical focus and impact which is highlighted by the book’s organizational pattern presenting at least three main theoretical perspectives in three different phases of European integration. These phases are distinguished according to the respective analytical focus on explaining integration (Part I), analysing governance (Part II), and constructing the Europolity (Part III). In order to substantiate the main message of each approach, the contributors have been asked to choose a ‘best case’ scenario (quality of governance; market consolidation; labour market policy; human rights policy; committee governance; agricultural policy; constitutional policy and so forth) and then, in addition,
apply their respective analytical perspective to the ‘test case’ scenario’ of enlargement. The combination of best and test case scenarios in all contributions demonstrates nicely how research object and goal are subject to the choice of the individual researcher, yet, never under conditions of her own choosing. The clearly opposing views in each part sustain the point, including first, federalist and intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist views on how European is best explained, second institutionalist, network and system-oriented approaches to analysing governance and, third social constructivist, gender-oriented and discursive perspectives on European integration. All offer telling cases for this understanding of context sensitive ‘theorising’.

While theoretical approaches do indeed raise general questions that are shared by a range of different approaches for example, the questions of how to explain institution building above the state, how to account for governance as a process that develops across national boundaries, and how to assess the emergence of a socio-political system critically, their respective ways of addressing these questions are not necessarily competitive. They are first and foremost complementary in style.

These observations, above all, invite the student of European integration not to think in closed boxes and traditions, but creatively about theorising European integration and governance, and not to dismiss other approaches all too easily. They also ask those engaged in this process of theorising to perhaps be more humble than has been the case in the past, and to be aware of the scope of the approach proposed and its place in the overall mosaic of European Integration Theory. Finally, they propose to take a closer
look at the issues involved in the linked processes of constitutionalisation and politicisation (see Table 12.3).

The mosaic of integration theory will never be finished. In order to keep providing fresh and relevant perspectives, however, it will have to be pushed forward by creativity, self-reflexivity and the study of fundamental issues underlying the core debates of past, present and future.

References


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**Die Methode des Konvents: Präparlamentarische Konstituante, Vorregierungs konferenz oder Deliberatives Forum?**

Der Konvent über die Zukunft der Europäischen Union hat einen Entwurf für eine EU-Verfassung vorgelegt. Der Konvent stellt aufgrund seiner Zusammensetzung, seiner Arbeitsmethoden und der sukzessiven Gestaltwerdung seines Arbeitsergebnisses einen spezifischen Beratungs- und Entscheidungsmodus eines öffentlich tagenden und Öffentlichkeit generierenden Forums dar, der sich von den traditionellen Verhandlungsmethoden der Europäischen Union abhebt. Erwartet wurde, daß aus dem argumentativen Bemühen aller Beteiligten um kollektiv akzeptierbare Problem- oder Konfliktlösungen eine transnationale öffentliche Debatte entsteht, die den Verlauf und das Ergebnis des Konvents einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit zuführt als dies bei Regierungskonferenzen der Fall war. Gemessen an den theoretischen Annahmen über deliberative Verhandlungsmethoden wäre das „ideale“ Produkt des Konvents (a.) das Erreichen eines gewissen Maßes an Verständnis und Respekt für kontroverse Positionen, (b.) die Schaffung eines höheren Rationalitätsniveaus innerhalb der nationalen Diskussionslandschaften und (c.) eine höhere Legitimität des letztendlich zu vereinbarenden Ergebnisses. Der Beitrag untersucht den Verlauf des Konvents anhand der folgenden vier Prüfparameter, die sich aus der Theorie deliberativer Verhandlungen herleiten lassen:

(a) Erstens gelten alle am deliberativen Prozeß Beteiligten als frei und ungebunden. Ihre einzige, gemeinsame Verpflichtung besteht in der Bereitschaft, an der Erreichung eines für alle tragbaren Ergebnisses mitzuwirken.

(b) Zweitens herrscht zwischen den Teilnehmenden Einverständnis über ihre gegenseitige Gleichheit, jedes Mitglied hat zu jedem Zeitpunkt des deliberativen Prozesses gleichwertige Beratungskapazitäten.

(c) Drittens beruht der deliberative Prozeß auf der Logik überzeugender Argumentation und Argumente; die Teilnehmer drohen nicht mit dem Gewicht des von ihnen repräsentierten Gemeinwesens oder mit dem einfachen, nicht weiter begründeten Verweis auf die Nichtdurchsetzbarkeit einer Position in ihrem Staat, Parlament oder gegenüber ihrer nationalen Öffentlichkeit. Das einzige Instrument zur Überzeugung anderer ist das bessere, von den anderen als überzeugender weil zur Problemlösung als angemessener erkannte Argument. Der Prozeß zielt letztlich ab auf die Erreichung eines rational motivierten Konsenses.

(d) Und viertens findet der Prozeß nicht hinter verschlossenen Türen, sondern im öffentlichen Raum der BürgerInnengesellschaften Europas statt. Diese erhoffte Öffentlichkeit soll „aus den kommunikativen Austauschprozessen zwischen Akteuren verschiedener Geltungsräume und internationalen Organisationen“ hervorgehen.¹

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